Morgan v. Town of Lexington
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9437
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- In October–December 2011 a middle‑school student (R.M.) in Lexington, MA, was repeatedly bullied and assaulted by peers (beating captured on video; repeated name‑calling, pushing, “table‑topping,” and multiple incidents of pants being pulled down). School officials investigated and acknowledged some incidents but reportedly declined to discipline students.
- R.M. and his mother (Morgan) repeatedly reported fear of retaliation; school officials at times told them to have R.M. report directly, and truancy officers visited R.M.’s home when he stayed out of school.
- R.M. missed substantial school time and ultimately enrolled briefly in a private school before returning and missing many days due to anxiety.
- Morgan sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of R.M.’s substantive due process right to bodily integrity, asserted multiple state tort claims, and sought to amend to add a Title IX claim.
- The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied leave to amend; the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether school officials' response (or inaction) to peer bullying violates substantive due process via a state‑created danger or special‑duty theory | Morgan: school officials took affirmative steps and created/increased risk (punishing R.M., sending police to his home, delaying/ineffective investigations) that deprived R.M. of bodily integrity | Defs: mere failure to prevent private violence, routine discipline and truancy enforcement, and parent‑admin conferences are not state action creating constitutional duty | Held: Dismissed — allegations do not show conduct that created or markedly increased danger or otherwise shocks the conscience; DeShaney line bars liability for failure to protect absent extreme facts |
| Whether Title IX claim (sex‑based harassment) plausibly alleged | Morgan: pants‑pulling and other conduct constitute sexual harassment on basis of sex creating hostile environment | Defs: harassment was undifferentiated bullying, not sex‑ or gender‑based, and isolated pants‑pulling is not sufficiently severe/pervasive | Held: Denial of leave to amend not an abuse — complaint lacks plausible sex‑based animus or severe/pervasive sexual harassment to state a Title IX claim |
| Whether amendment to add Title IX claim was futile | Morgan: amendment would cure defect by alleging sexualized incidents | Defs: facts alleged are insufficient as a matter of law | Held: Futility affirmed — amendment would not survive Rule 12(b)(6) review |
| Whether plaintiff pleaded the necessary causation and culpability for § 1983 liability | Morgan: school acts/inaction materially contributed to injuries | Defs: plaintiffs fail to allege how routine administrative acts caused or increased risk | Held: Insufficient causal nexus; prior First Circuit precedent precludes liability on these facts |
Key Cases Cited
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (state’s failure to protect from private violence generally does not violate Due Process)
- Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (Title IX private‑school liability for student‑on‑student sexual harassment requires actual knowledge and deliberate indifference to severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment)
- Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing causation and limits on due‑process liability for failure to protect; subpoena/enforcement did not create state‑created danger)
- Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 1999) (school inaction rarely gives rise to constitutional duty absent ‘‘pungent facts’’ or special custodial relationship)
- Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (public schools generally do not possess such control over children to impose a constitutional duty to protect in ordinary circumstances)
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to infer discrimination on the basis of sex)
- Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2002) (Title IX claims lie against educational institutions and require sex‑based discrimination)
- Ouch v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 799 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2015) (pleading standards; documents incorporated into complaints considered on Rule 12(b)(6))