Morgan v. Thorton, 3:19-cv-00384

Background

Plaintiff Kentarkius Jamel Morgan, an FDOC inmate, sues five Suwannee Correctional Institution officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth Amendment excessive force/failure-to-protect and seeks compensatory damages.
Alleged incidents: Nov. 8, 2017 — other inmates attacked Morgan with homemade weapons; Officer Thorton allegedly slammed him and broke his jaw and Officer Dimaurio kicked him. March 12, 2018 — after returning from medical treatment, Morgan alleges Thorton and Dimaurio threatened and struck him in retaliation for filing a complaint. May 15, 2018 — while on "house alone" status, another inmate was placed in his cell and assaulted him while officers (Pope-Jones, Lynn, Deloach) watched; Morgan filed an informal grievance about this incident.
Defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing (1) Eleventh Amendment immunity for official-capacity damages and (2) failure to exhaust administrative remedies for the March and May 2018 incidents.
The court treated the exhaustion defense as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion (per Turner/Whatley methodology) and evaluated the record and Morgan’s verified complaint/declarations.
Rulings: official-capacity damages barred by Eleventh Amendment; March 12, 2018 claims dismissed for failure to properly exhaust; November 2017 and May 15, 2018 claims survive and will proceed to settlement/trial; case referred for pro bono counsel.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Eleventh Amendment immunity for official-capacity damages	Morgan seeks compensatory damages from defendants in their official capacities.	Money damages against state actors in official capacity are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.	Granted in part — official-capacity money claims dismissed.
Exhaustion — March 12, 2018 incident	Morgan says he filed an informal grievance but it was unacknowledged, censored, or disposed of by staff.	FDOC records show no informal/formal grievances for March incident; plaintiff did not complete grievance steps.	Dismissed — plaintiff failed to properly exhaust (no follow-up or completion of grievance process).
Exhaustion — May 15, 2018 incident	Morgan submitted an informal grievance the day of the incident; institution responded acknowledging he was housed alone.	Defendants contend no exhaustion, but records and grievance response exist.	Survives — informal grievance was accepted/answered, so exhaustion was proper and claim proceeds.
Procedural treatment of exhaustion on summary judgment	Morgan’s verified complaint and declaration should be considered as sworn statements for summary-judgment/exhaustion analysis.	Defendants rely on custodial records and declarations to show lack of grievances; exhaustion is an affirmative defense to be treated under Turner/Rule 12(b) procedures.	Court applied Turner two-step: accepted plaintiff’s factual view initially, then made findings; treated verified complaint as affidavit-equivalent; exhaustion analyzed and resolved accordingly.

Key Cases Cited

Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1986) (Eleventh Amendment bars money suits against the state via official-capacity claims)
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (state sovereign immunity in monetary recovery actions)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (PLRA exhaustion is mandatory but need not be pleaded in the complaint)
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (PLRA requires proper exhaustion under applicable rules)
Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008) (exhaustion is a matter in abatement; procedural treatment explained)
Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008) (two-step framework for resolving exhaustion disputes)
Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2015) (application of Turner two-step in exhaustion analysis)
Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2010) (no requirement that a grievance name every defendant)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard)