Morgan v. Hardy
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22500
7th Cir.2011Background
- Morgan was convicted in Cook County for the murders of Motley and Merkson and the rape and aggravated kidnapping of Gregson; sentenced to life after postconviction relief issues.
- Morgan's conviction was affirmed by Illinois courts; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari; state postconviction petitions followed, culminating in a life sentence.
- Morgan filed for federal habeas corpus; the district court denied relief but issued a COA; the Seventh Circuit reviews de novo under AEDPA.
- Prater recanted decades later, offering a new version implicating Morgan; the Illinois Supreme Court found Prater incredible and did not credit the recantation.
- Morgan raised claims: Prater recantation credibility, Brady violation, Giglio, and ineffective assistance (Strickland/Cronic) plus evidentiary hearing issues; district court denied relief.
- The court affirms the district court’s denial, applying AEDPA’s deferential standard to state-court factual findings and legal determinations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recantation credibility under §2254(d)(2)? | Morgan argues Prater's recantation is credible and undermines the state court findings. | Illinois Supreme Court's credibility determinations were reasonable. | No, recantation credibility is not shown to be unreasonable. |
| Brady materiality of Gregson's arrests withheld? | Morgan claims nondisclosure of Gregson's drug charges and leniency was material to impeachment. | State court found suppressed evidence not material given corroboration and other evidence. | No material Brady violation; suppressed evidence not likely to have changed result. |
| Giglio perjury/leniency credibility? | Prater and Gregson testimony were perjured to benefit Morgan's conviction. | Recantation unreliable; no proven perjury; any leniency evidence does not prove false testimony. | No due process violation; Giglio claim rejected. |
| Ineffective assistance (Strickland) prejudice? | Counsel deficient for failing to present mental-state defenses and for absences; prejudice shown. | No prejudice; defenses unlikely to succeed; co-counsel filled gaps; not Cronic prejudice. | No Strickland prejudice; no habeas relief on this claim. |
| Cronic vs Strickland standard applied? | Counsel's absence at critical stages warrants Cronic prejudice. | Counsel was present; Strickland standard applies; no automatic prejudice. | Strickland applied; no Cronic prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel; prejudice and deficient performance)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (duty to disclose exculpatory material)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (due process and use of perjured testimony; impeachment evidence)
- Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (presumed prejudice when counsel is completely absent at a critical stage)
- White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (presumed prejudice where a defendant pleads guilty without counsel)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (reasonableness standard for applying federal law under AEDPA)
- Collins v. Gaetz, 612 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2010) (deferential review of state-court factual findings)
- Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010) (state-court factual determinations reviewed for reasonableness)
- Toliver v. McCaughtry, 539 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2008) (clarifies standard for unreasonable factual determinations under § 2254(d)(2))