114 F. Supp. 3d 434
S.D. Tex.2015Background
- Plaintiff Roddie Morgan (initially pro se) sued FedEx under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for racially discriminatory termination; termination occurred Aug. 29, 2011 and suit was filed Aug. 22, 2013.
- FedEx moved for summary judgment on Dec. 1, 2014; Morgan did not file a timely response and took no discovery during the case.
- Morgan obtained counsel only on Feb. 5, 2015 and moved for leave to file a 21-day late response; FedEx opposed and argued Morgan’s failure to respond should be treated as no opposition.
- The parties’ employment application/agreement (signed by Morgan in 1995) contained a six‑month contractual limitations clause requiring suit within the time prescribed by law or six months from the event, whichever expired first.
- The Court denied Morgan’s motion for leave to file a late response for lack of diligence and then considered FedEx’s summary judgment on the merits.
- The Court granted FedEx’s motion for summary judgment, holding Morgan’s § 1981 claim barred by the six‑month contractual limitations period that Morgan knowingly and voluntarily accepted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Morgan should be allowed to file a late response to FedEx’s summary judgment motion | Morgan (via new counsel) sought leave to file late, asserting he retained counsel after being outmatched and needed to present his claims | FedEx argued Morgan was given notice of deadlines, failed to act diligently, and had counsel-assisted filings earlier — no leniency warranted | Denied: court found Morgan not diligent, had clear notice, and offered no reasonable excuse for delay |
| Whether Morgan’s § 1981 claim is time‑barred by the parties’ six‑month contractual limitations clause | Morgan did not oppose on timeliness in a timely way and offered no justification for delay | FedEx argued the signed employment agreement contained an enforceable six‑month limitations clause that bars Morgan’s 2‑year‑later suit | Granted for FedEx: court held the clause was clear, knowingly and voluntarily accepted, and reasonable; it barred the § 1981 claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se pleadings receive liberal construction)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (limits on pro se pleadings do not excuse compliance with procedural rules)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant’s initial burden and nonmovant’s obligation to present evidence)
- Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (post‑1991 § 1981 claims governed by a four‑year limitations period unless parties contract otherwise)
- Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (parties may agree to shorter contractual limitations periods if reasonable)
- Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013) (contractual limitations clauses can be enforceable against federal causes of action)