Morgan v. Dzurenda, 956 F.3d 84

Morgan, a prisoner with a reputation as a informant from prior cooperation with prison intelligence, was transferred to Osborn CI and repeatedly threatened by inmate Gabriel Rodriguez (a Los Solidos gang affiliate).
Morgan submitted written Inmate Request Forms to Captain Kyle Godding (Nov. 14, 2013) and Warden Carol Chapdelaine (Dec. 2, 2013) and also warned them verbally that Rodriguez had threatened to "beat [him] real badly and snap [his] neck" and that he feared for his safety.
On Jan. 5, 2014, while officers Maritza Maldonado and Jeremy Lindsay were on shift, Rodriguez assaulted Morgan in the shower; Morgan called for officers but alleges no one intervened immediately.
Morgan sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to his safety by Chapdelaine, Godding, Maldonado, and Lindsay; the district court granted summary judgment for all defendants.
The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment as to Maldonado and Lindsay but vacated and remanded the grant as to Chapdelaine and Godding, concluding Morgan presented triable evidence that they were subjectively aware of and deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to his safety.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Warden Chapdelaine and Capt. Godding were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to Morgan's safety	Morgan argued he gave detailed, repeated written and verbal notice of specific threats by Rodriguez and the defendants ignored him	Defendants argued they were not on notice of a substantial risk or did not act with requisite subjective knowledge	Vacated summary judgment as to Chapdelaine and Godding — triable issue exists that they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk
Whether Officers Maldonado and Lindsay were deliberately indifferent/failing to protect during the assault	Morgan argued he warned them and they failed to respond to his calls for help	Defendants argued they lacked detailed notice of a substantial risk and were not subjectively aware	Affirmed summary judgment for Maldonado and Lindsay — warnings lacked sufficient detail to show subjective knowledge
Whether supervisory-liability/respondeat superior theory applies	Morgan relied on supervisors' actions/inactions (written requests and oral complaints)	Defendants relied on the principle that supervisors are not liable under respondeat superior absent personal involvement	Court held supervisory-liability doctrine was not the basis here; claims against Chapdelaine and Godding are premised on their own acts/omissions rather than on respondeat superior

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (Eighth Amendment duty to protect prisoners; deliberate indifference standard requires subjective knowledge)
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (limits on supervisor liability; no respondeat superior in § 1983 claims)
Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995) (elements for establishing a supervisory defendant's personal involvement)
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1994) (deliberate indifference has objective and subjective prongs)
Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997) (Eighth Amendment imposes duty to protect prisoners from other inmates)
Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1999) (evidence that facts were known can permit a jury to infer deliberate indifference)