Morgan v. Dickhaut
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 8633
| 1st Cir. | 2012Background
- Morgan challenged a Massachusetts first-degree murder conviction on AEDPA grounds after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) upheld his conviction on sufficiency grounds; no physical evidence tied Morgan to Rowe’s murder, but circumstantial evidence showed motive, opportunity, and consciousness of guilt; multiple witnesses testified to Morgan’s statements and actions suggesting he planned or attempted to kill Rowe; Morgan argued the SJC applied the wrong standard or, if correct, that the evidence was insufficient to convict under Jackson v. Virginia; the district court denied relief but issued a certificate on the sufficiency issue under a principal liability theory; Morgan proceeds on direct appeal and habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
- Morgan was last seen with Rowe and Johnson in a green sedan; Rowe’s body was found with a gunshot wound days later; Morgan’s statements and conduct (calling a witness, offering money for counsel, seeking a “clean” gun, threats against robbers) supported an inference of guilt; the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence to prove Morgan fired the shot under a principal liability theory, though no weapon or fingerprints linked him directly to the crime; the jury convicted Morgan of deliberately premeditated murder in the first degree; the SJC analyzed sufficiency under the Latimore framework and did not depart from Jackson; the district court’s AEDPA-based questions are reviewed de novo for whether the state court’s decision was contrary to or unreasonably applied federal law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the SJC applied Jackson v. Virginia’s standard correctly. | Morgan argues SJC applied a non-Jackson standard or misapplied it. | Morgan I–Morgan II show SJC followed Latimore and used Jackson’s standard. | SJC applied Jackson correctly; no unreasonable application. |
| Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Morgan as the principal actor. | Evidence favored Johnson; Morgan asserts no genuine equal/inferior evidence. | There was ample circumstantial evidence pointing to Morgan and the jury resolved credibility. | Evidence sufficient; Morgan not entitled to relief. |
| Whether the AEDPA standard was met for an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. | District court erred in finding the state court’s decision reasonable. | Decision reasonably applied Jackson to the totality of the evidence. | District court’s ruling affirmed; no AEDPA relief. |
| Whether procedure on joint venture vs principal liability impacted the conviction. | If only joint venture supported conviction, then error if principal liability required. | Conviction supported under principal liability independent of joint venture issues. | Conviction sustained under Massachusetts law and Jackson standard. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mass. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979) (Mass. 1979) (adoption of Jackson-based sufficiency standard in Massachusetts)
- Commonwealth v. Salemme, 481 N.E.2d 471 (Mass. 1985) (Mass. 1985) (insufficiency when theory leaves guilt in equipoise; consciousness of guilt evidence cannot prove guilt alone)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (U.S. Supreme Court 1979) (requires review of whether any rational trier could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- O'Laughlin v. O'Brien, 568 F.3d 287 (1st Cir. 2009) (1st Cir. 2009) (deference and totality-of-the-evidence approach in AEDPA sufficiency review)
- United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 1995) (1st Cir. 1995) (reaffirmed need to view evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution)
- McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (1st Cir. 2002) (“some increment of incorrectness beyond error” standard under AEDPA)
- Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2001) (1st Cir. 2001) (statutory standards and reasonableness guidance in habeas review)
- Guerrero-Guerrero v. United States, 776 F.2d 1071 (1st Cir. 1985) (1st Cir. 1985) (jury’s interpretation of evidence within reasonable range)
