Morgan v. CABELA'S INC.
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22683
E.D. Ky.2011Background
- Clifford Morgan purchased a hunting tree stand from a Cabela's catalog; the stand was manufactured by North Starr Treestands, Inc.
- On November 5, 2006, Morgan died after the stand allegedly broke during use.
- Rose Morgan, as administratrix of the estate, sued Cabela's and North Starr for defective product liability theories (strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, failure to warn).
- Cabela's moved for summary judgment, asserting protection as a middleman under Kentucky's Middleman Statute, K.R.S. 411.340.
- Morgan argued (1) lack of jurisdiction over North Starr defeats the statute and (2) Cabela's breached an express warranty.
- The court denied summary judgment, finding issues of fact as to whether Cabela's statements created an express warranty and whether the middleman protection applies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does K.R.S. 411.340 shield Cabela's as a middleman? | Morgan argues North Starr’s lack of jurisdiction defeats middleman protection. | Cabela's contends it qualifies as a middleman if the manufacturer is identified and within jurisdiction, and no express warranty bar exists. | No summary judgment; issues of fact remain on whether Cabela's is shielded and whether a warranty arose. |
| Was Morgan entitled to more discovery time before ruling on summary judgment? | Morgan claims insufficient time for discovery. | Court has ample time; discovery period completed for dispositive motion. | Sufficient discovery time shown; summary judgment appropriate for decision. |
| Does North Starr's lack of personal jurisdiction defeat the middleman defense? | Morgan asserts no jurisdiction over the manufacturer prevents protection for the middleman. | If manufacturer is identified and subject to jurisdiction, middleman protection applies; lack of jurisdiction argument is inappropriate here. | North Starr waived lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to raise it in its first responsive pleading; thus waiver defeats this defense. |
| Did Cabela's statements create an express warranty under Kentucky law? | Various catalog letters/ads promise field-testing and reliability, constituting express warranties. | Most statements amount to puffing or general marketing, not specific warranties; basis-of-bargain issue contested. | Issue of fact remains; a reasonable jury could find an express warranty existed, so summary judgment denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Olinger v. Corporation of the President of the Church, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (summary judgment standard guidance; need for genuine dispute of material fact)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1986) (genuine issue of material fact required for summary judgment)
- Wedding v. Duncan, 310 Ky. 374, 220 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949) (express warranty analysis; puffing vs. warranty)
- Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc., 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982) (warranty basis-of-bargain determination; reliance and inducement)
- Moore v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 888 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishes puffing from express warranties)
- Jarrett v. Duro-Med Industries, 2008 WL 89932 (E.D. Ky. 2008) (recognizes criteria for warranty basis; (note: WL cited but included for context; official reporter not provided here))
- Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003) (waiver of personal jurisdiction defense if not raised in first responsive pleading)