246 Cal. App. 4th 144
Cal. Ct. App.2016Background
- On March 17, 2011 Beaumont Police Officer Brian Stehli pursued a pickup driven by Thomas Durnin for nearly 12 minutes; Durnin crossed into oncoming traffic and collided head-on with decedent Mike Morgan, who later died.
- Plaintiffs (Morgan's widow and daughter) sued the City of Beaumont and Beaumont Police Department (BPD) for wrongful death.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing immunity under Vehicle Code § 17004.7, which protects agencies that "adopt and promulgate" a written vehicular pursuit policy and provide annual training.
- Trial court granted summary judgment, finding BPD had a policy and procedure in place and thus was immune.
- On appeal the court considered whether defendants showed as a matter of law that BPD had (1) promulgated the policy (i.e., all peace officers certified in writing they had received, read, and understood it) and (2) provided required annual training; the court reversed for failure to prove promulgation.
- Record evidence showed BPD used Lexipol and email distribution; many officers only acknowledged "receipt" by email, distribution reports showed numerous officers had not accepted the policy, and the department did not retain signed certifications showing each officer had "received, read, and understand[ed]" the pursuit policy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §17004.7 immunity applies when an agency has not shown it "promulgated" a pursuit policy (i.e., all peace officers certified in writing they received, read, and understand it) | Plaintiffs: BPD did not prove promulgation; email "receipt" acknowledgments and Lexipol records do not satisfy the statutory written certification requirement for all officers. | Defendants: Policy was disseminated via Lexipol and email; departmental requirement to acknowledge receipt and the failure of an individual officer to sign cannot be used to deny immunity. | Reversed summary judgment: statute unambiguously requires written certification by all peace officers to show promulgation; defendants failed to prove this as a matter of law. |
| Whether the statutory proviso ("failure of an individual officer to sign ... shall not be used to impose liability") negates the certification requirement for immunity | Plaintiffs: The proviso prevents using an officer's failure to sign to impose liability, but does not eliminate the agency-wide promulgation requirement for immunity. | Defendants: The proviso suggests leniency and should allow immunity despite missing signatures. | Held: The proviso addresses liability, not immunity; it does not excuse the agency from proving promulgation as a prerequisite to immunity. |
| Whether distribution/acknowledgment via Lexipol/email satisfies promulgation requirement | Plaintiffs: Electronic distribution and receipt-only acknowledgments do not show officers "received, read, and understand" the policy; department failed to retain required written certifications. | Defendants: Lexipol/email dissemination and internal acknowledgement procedures show policy was promulgated. | Held: Evidence of email receipt and Lexipol reports (which showed many officers had not accepted) did not establish the statutorily required written certifications by all peace officers. |
| Whether summary judgment could be affirmed on negligence/causation grounds | Plaintiffs: Issues of causation and officer conduct (whether pursuit was terminated before collision) were disputed; expert testimony raised triable issues. | Defendants: Court found chase was terminated before collision, implying no negligence by officer. | Held: Triable issues exist on causation and whether pursuit was ongoing at collision; summary judgment cannot be sustained on negligence ground. |
Key Cases Cited
- Nguyen v. City of Westminster, 103 Cal.App.4th 1161 (criticized blanket immunity where agencies merely adopt policy)
- Kishida v. State of California, 229 Cal.App.3d 329 (interpretation of former §17004.7)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826 (summary judgment standard and burdens)
- Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc., 231 Cal.App.4th 11 (causation ordinarily a question of fact)