Morgan v. AURORA PUMP CO.
248 P.3d 1052
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- James Morgan worked at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard from 1952–1989 with exposures to asbestos; he developed mesothelioma and died in 2008, with Kay Morgan as plaintiff.”
- Morgan filed a 2007 King County suit against about 50 defendants alleging products liability, negligence, strict liability, and warranty theories based on asbestos exposure.
- Respondents were manufacturers/suppliers of pumps and valves alleged to have included asbestos-containing packing/gaskets, and replacement parts potentially containing asbestos, used at PSNS.
- The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing Morgan’s claims under Braaten and Simonetta, prompting this appeal.
- Washington law allows exposure proof via direct or circumstantial evidence and uses Lockwood factors to assess causation at summary judgment.
- Morgan presented testimony/declarations indicating exposure to Respondents’ products or replacement parts and acknowledged that some products contained asbestos.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Morgan can show exposure to Respondents’ asbestos products to survive summary judgment | Morgan evidence supports exposure to defendants’ products | Evidence insufficient to link Morgan to specific Respondents’ products | Issues of material fact exist; summary judgment reversed |
| Whether circumstantial/alternative exposure evidence suffices under Lockwood | Exposure through worksite presence suffices | Need direct evidence of specific product exposure | Genuine factual issues regarding exposure under Lockwood |
| Whether Braaten is controlling on the facts | Morgan distinguished Braaten by evidence of original exposure | Braaten controls where no original exposure evidence exists | Braaten distinguished; Morgan survives based on original exposure evidence |
| Whether the government-contractor defense applies | Defense not dispositive; not applicable to warning claims | Defense is applicable and requires jury determination | Affirmative defense; fact-intensive; jury to decide |
| Whether summary judgment was proper under RCW 7.72.030(1) | Evidence creates triable issues of causation | No material factual dispute as to causation | Summary judgment improper; remand for trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 165 Wash.2d 373, 198 P.3d 493 (2008) (asbestos exposure proof limited when not linking to defendants’ products)
- Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 165 Wash.2d 341, 197 P.3d 127 (2008) (no duty to warn for asbestos from products not manufactured/supplied by defendant)
- Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235, 744 P.2d 605 (1987) (factors for causation; exposure need not be to direct product; drift and proximity matter)
- Van Hout v. Celotex Corp., 121 Wash.2d 697, 853 P.2d 908 (1993) (circumstantial proof permissible with reasonable inferences)
- Berry v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 103 Wash.App. 312, 14 P.3d 789 (2000) (evidence of distributor exposure can raise issue under Lockwood)
- Allen v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 138 Wash.App. 564, 157 P.3d 406 (2007) (recognizes direct or circumstantial proof of exposure at workplace)