Morgan, Dewan, PD-0758-15

Background

Regina Raglin lived alone in an apartment, paid the rent, and was the only person on the lease; she gave her boyfriend, Dewan Morgan, a key and he sometimes stayed there and kept belongings.
After an argument, Regina locked a deadbolt that could only be opened from inside, denied Morgan entry, and called 9-1-1 when he persisted outside.
Morgan pounded, rang, shattered a kitchen window, kicked the door open (deadbolt engaged), entered, and assaulted Regina (grabbing, punching, choking, biting).
Police arrived, found Morgan on top of Regina assaulting her, arrested him; a jury convicted Morgan of burglary of a habitation and assault and sentenced him to 12 years.
The Second Court of Appeals reversed the burglary conviction as legally insufficient, reasoning Morgan had tenancy/possessory rights; the State petitioned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which granted review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Morgan / Court of Appeals)	Held (Court of Criminal Appeals review question)
Who qualifies as the "owner" for burglary of a habitation?	Penal Code definition controls: owner = title, possession, or greater right to possession; Regina had possession and greater right because she paid rent and was on the lease.	Morgan/Ct. of Appeals used common-law property/cohabitation principles (tenant at will or sufferance) to find he had sufficient possessory interest.	Whether courts must apply the Penal Code's expansive owner definition rather than common-law property rules when assessing ownership for burglary.
When is consent revoked for purposes of "entry without effective consent"?	Consent is measured at the moment immediately before entry; Regina effectively revoked consent by locking the deadbolt, denying entry, and calling 911—so any entry thereafter was without consent.	Ct. of Appeals treated prior permissive access and cohabitation (sleeping there, belongings) as evidence that consent existed at time of entry.	Whether revocation of consent can be established by the victim's immediate pre-entry actions (deadbolt/denial) such that subsequent forced entry constitutes burglary.
Whether appellate court may apply property-law concepts not submitted to jury when reviewing sufficiency	State: No — applying unpled property doctrines amounts to acting as a thirteenth juror and improperly reweighs evidence; courts should defer to jury and Penal Code definitions.	Ct. of Appeals implicitly defended its analysis applying possessory doctrines to evaluate ownership.	Whether the appellate court improperly substituted its judgment by applying common-law property principles not presented to the jury in assessing legal sufficiency.
Standard for legal sufficiency review	State: Apply Jackson v. Virginia—view evidence in light most favorable to verdict; a rational juror could find Regina was owner and had revoked consent.	Ct. of Appeals found evidence insufficient under that standard.	Whether the Second Court of Appeals correctly applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard.

Key Cases Cited

Alexander v. State, 753 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (possession/greater right to possession informs who is the "owner" for burglary)
Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Penal Code's owner definition is expansive)
Dominguez v. State, 355 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref'd) (possession assessed immediately prior to break-in)
Mack v. State, 928 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref'd) (focus on whether alleged owner's right to possession is greater than defendant's)
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (legal-sufficiency standard and deference to jury in Jackson review)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (establishes standard for appellate legal-sufficiency review)