Morgan, Dewan
PD-0758-15
| Tex. App. | Jul 1, 2015Background
- Victim Regina Raglin lived alone in an apartment and paid the rent; she let Dewan (Appellee) move in, gave him a key, and he contributed intermittently to bills and groceries but was not on the lease.
- After an argument, Raglin locked a deadbolt (only unlockable from inside) shortly before Appellee returned; his key no longer worked and she refused to open the door.
- Appellee forced entry—breaking a window and kicking in the door with the deadbolt engaged—and assaulted Raglin (punching, biting, choking); police arrived during the assault.
- A jury convicted Appellee of burglary of a habitation and assessed 12 years; the Second Court of Appeals reversed the burglary conviction as legally insufficient and modified the judgment to an assault conviction, remanding for punishment.
- The State petitions the Court of Criminal Appeals raising two issues: (1) whether courts must consult property/landlord-tenant law to determine who qualifies as the Penal Code’s definition of an “owner” in burglary cases; and (2) how long after revocation of consent a former live-in partner’s entry is treated as “without the effective consent of the owner.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Morgan/Appellee) | Held (Second Court of Appeals) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether courts should use property law to determine who is an “owner” under Penal Code burglary statute | Penal Code’s internal definition of “owner” (title, possession, or greater right to possession) is sufficient; courts should not import common-law landlord-tenant doctrines | Appellee argued he had possessory rights (co-tenant/tenant at will or sufferance) because he lived there and kept belongings, so he was not an intruder | Court of Appeals treated the evidence as insufficient to prove entry was without owner’s effective consent and reversed burglary conviction (holding Appellee was a cotenant and tenancy was not terminated) |
| Timing required between revocation of consent and subsequent forcible entry to constitute burglary | Revocation can be immediate; victim who locks deadbolt and refuses entry has effectively revoked consent even minutes before entry | Appellee argued consent had not been terminated; victim’s later expressed intention (cooling-off) showed she did not terminate tenancy permanently | Court of Appeals concluded evidence insufficient to show consent was effectively revoked prior to entry (no termination of tenancy shown) |
| Proper standard for assessing “possession” (when to measure possessory rights) | Possession should be determined by who had possession immediately prior to the break-in (Dominguez standard) | Appellee relied on evidence showing prior shared possession and no clear termination | Court of Appeals applied a standard that treated Appellee’s earlier possession as sufficient to establish cotenant status at time of entry |
| Appellate sufficiency review scope | State: appellate courts must apply Penal Code definition and defer to jury credibility findings; should not apply extraneous property law or act as 13th juror | Appellee: evidence showed his ongoing occupancy and no termination—reversal appropriate | Court of Appeals reversed burglary conviction for legal insufficiency (modified to assault) |
Key Cases Cited
- Alexander v. State, 753 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (discusses ‘owner’/possessory-rights concept in burglary context)
- Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (recognizes the Penal Code’s expansive definition of “owner”)
- Dominguez v. State, 355 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011) (possession should be determined immediately prior to, not during, the break-in)
- Mack v. State, 928 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996) (a defendant may have some possessory rights but still be guilty if the complainant has greater right to possession)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (standards for Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency review)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (legal sufficiency standard: viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict, could a rational juror find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)