Moreno v. Entergy Corp.
64 So. 3d 761
La.2011Background
- Moreno sustained injuries near an overhead power line in Jefferson Parish and sued multiple defendants, including Entergy.
- Entergy asserted third-party cross-claims seeking indemnity under the Overhead Power Line Safety Act (OPLSA).
- Trial court ruled OPLSA does not create an independent indemnity right against third-party contractors.
- Court of Appeal affirmed prematurity-based dismissal sua sponte, stating Entergy's indemnity claims were premature as no fault or damages had been allocated.
- Entergy and Stewart Interior Contractors, LLC filed writs; this Court granted review to address prematurity and the proper vehicle for raising it.
- Holding: there is no exception of no cause of action based on prematurity, and such an exception cannot be raised sua sponte by an appellate court; the matter should be remanded for further consideration on proper grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May the court of appeal raise prematurity sua sponte? | Moreno and Entergy: prematurity is a dilatory defect; only Article 926(B) governs and cannot be sua sponte. | Entergy: court of appeal cannot fashion a prematurity exception on its own; the proper vehicle is a dilatory exception. | No; prematurity cannot be raised sua sponte by the court of appeal. |
| Is prematurity an appropriate basis to dismiss a third-party indemnity claim before judgment on the principal action? | Indemnity claims are ripe when third party may be liable; article 1111-1116 permit third-party impleader. | Prematurity is a valid basis to delay dismissal until ripe, | Prematurity and no-cause-of-action theories address different inquiries and prematurity is not applicable here. |
| Are the functions of 'no cause of action' and 'prematurity' the same? | Entergy's claim should be considered under no-cause-of-action for legal sufficiency. | Prematurity tests ripeness; no-cause-of-action tests legal sufficiency. | They are distinct; the court of appeal erred by conflating them. |
Key Cases Cited
- Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So. 2d 1234 (La. 1993) (no-cause-of-action vs. prematurity distinction)
- Steed v. St. Paul's United Methodist Church, 728 So. 2d 931 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1999) (prematurity; distinction from no cause of action; waiver when not raised)
- Steeg v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 329 So. 2d 719 (La. 1976) (prematurity can be raised by various pleadings; framework for prematurity defense)
- Teche Financial Services, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, 939 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2006) (prematurity not supplyable by appellate court)
- O'Meara v. Union Oil Co., 212 La. 745, 33 So. 2d 506 (La. 1947) (precedent on raising prematurity defenses)
- Williamson v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson, 888 So. 2d 782 (La. 2004) (prematurity ripeness framework)
- Farber v. La. State Board of Medical Examiners, 22 So. 3d 962 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2009) (prematurity discussion and application)