2023 Ohio 386
Ohio Ct. App.2023Background
- Morelia Group (commercial developer) sued Sycamore Township trustee Thomas Weidman in his individual capacity for tortious interference, claiming he used his trustee role to block Morelia’s 2019 purchase offer because of personal animus.
- Past history: between 2009–2012 Morelia’s principal, Hildebrant, negotiated land buys for the township; Morelia alleges Weidman demanded kickbacks and retaliated when those were not paid.
- In October 2019 Morelia presented a purchase offer at a trustee meeting; the township law director and Weidman voiced procedural and valuation concerns.
- Morelia alleges Weidman’s expressed objections were pretextual and motivated by malice/bad faith, and that but for Weidman the board would have accepted the offer.
- Weidman moved for judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C), asserting statutory immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); the trial court denied the motion.
- On interlocutory appeal the First District affirmed, holding Morelia’s complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could overcome R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) immunity; the court declined to resolve the separate qualified-privilege defense on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) bars suit | Complaint alleges malice/bad faith/wanton conduct by Weidman sufficient to pierce immunity | Weidman argues actions were within trustee duties and justified, so immunity applies | At pleading stage the complaint plausibly alleges malice/pretext; immunity not resolved for Weidman |
| Whether the court may treat trustee-meeting minutes as conclusive | Minutes are not pleadings; disputed statements cannot be judicially noticed | Minutes are public record central to the claim and may be noticed | Court may notice the meeting occurred but not the disputed substantive statements in the minutes |
| Whether qualified privilege is reviewable on interlocutory appeal under R.C. 2744.02(C) | Qualified-privilege is a merits defense (not statutory immunity) and not appealable now | Privilege is a legal immunity and therefore appealable as denial of immunity | Court lacks jurisdiction to decide qualified-privilege on interlocutory appeal; R.C. 2744’s definition of “law” excludes common-law immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Maternal Grandmother, Admr. v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 193 N.E.3d 536 (Ohio 2021) (notice-pleading standard permits pleading malice/bad faith to survive immunity challenge at pleading stage)
- Reister v. Gardner, 174 N.E.3d 713 (Ohio 2020) (standard for Civ.R. 12(C) dismissal)
- Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 752 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 2001) (motions for judgment on the pleadings are restricted to the pleadings)
- Lamar Advantage GP Co., LLC v. City of Cincinnati, 176 N.E.3d 81 (Ohio 2021) (jurisdictional scope over interlocutory denials of political-subdivision immunity)
- Buchenroth v. City of Cincinnati, 140 N.E.3d 114 (Ohio 2019) (judicial notice limited to undisputed public-record matters on pleading motions)
- Martcheva v. Dayton Bd. of Edn., 179 N.E.3d 687 (Ohio 2021) (definitions of malice and bad faith in immunity context)
- Jackson v. McDonald, 760 N.E.2d 24 (Ohio App. 2001) (acts motivated by actual malice are outside scope of employment)
- Drain v. Kosydar, 374 N.E.2d 1253 (Ohio 1978) (actual malice can put conduct outside official scope)