Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565

Background

Central Falls faced severe municipal distress with negative net assets and large pension obligations, triggering state intervention.
In 2010, the mayor and city council sought a judicial receiver; Pfeiffer was appointed as receiver under Chapter 9 of Title 45, as amended.
Simultaneously, the General Assembly revised Chapter 9 to create a state-led framework for fiscal stability, retroactive to May 15, 2010, prohibiting municipal petitions for judicial receiverships.
The act established a tiered oversight mechanism including a fiscal overseer, budget and review commission, and a state receiver, with the director of revenue controlling transition and termination.
The city council and mayor later sought consent to transition from court receivership to state oversight, and Pfeiffer asserted he could exercise broad powers, including superseding elected officials.
Suits were consolidated, and the trial court held the act constitutional, prompting the mayor and city council to appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the act applies generally to all cities and towns	Marran-like claim that the act applies generally and thus complies with home-rule.	Act applies to all municipalities and is not a single-city exception; it furthers statewide concerns.	Yes; act applies generally to all cities and towns.
Whether the act alters the form of government in violation of home-rule	Receiver’s powers usurp legislative/executive functions, changing local government structure.	Powers are bounded, temporary, and channelled; elected officials remain and serve advisory roles.	No; impact is temporary and channelled, not a permanent alteration.
Whether the act violates separation of powers at the municipal level	State intervenes in municipal governance, usurping local powers.	Municipal separation of powers is not guaranteed; the act operates within state oversight.	No meaningful municipal separation-of-powers doctrine applies; no constitutional violation found.
Whether the act violates substantive due process or is vague/nondelegation	Broad delegation to a receiver shocks due process and permits arbitrary action; vague standards.	Standards are intelligible; consultation and five-factor framework constrain discretion; delegation is permissible.	No; statute is not arbitrary or vague, and delegation is permissible.
Whether the equal protection challenge to collective bargaining provisions is viable	Section 45-9-9 creates two classes (union vs. nonunion) in violation of equal protection.	Union members are not similarly situated to elected officials; no equal-protection violation.	No; no equal-protection violation.

Key Cases Cited

Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174 (R.I. 1994) (home-rule safeguards; general application requirement; temporary impact)
City of Cranston v. Hall, 354 A.2d 415 (R.I. 1976) (general application vs local concern; form of government protection)
Newport Court Club Associates v. Town Council of Middletown, 800 A.2d 405 (R.I. 2002) (presumption of validity; constitutional questions reviewed cautiously)
O’Neil (Town of East Greenwich v. O’Neil), 617 A.2d 104 (R.I. 1992) (separation of powers not applicable to municipal level; towns as state creatures)
Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (U.S. 1900) (public offices are not property rights; office as public trust)
Brunelle v. Town of South Kingstown, 700 A.2d 1075 (R.I. 1997) (substantive due process requires substantial relation to welfare)
Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Board of Review, 875 A.2d 1 (R.I. 2005) ( vagueness and nondelegation standards; intelligible standards suffice)
Trembley v. City of Central Falls, 480 A.2d 1359 (R.I. 1984) (nondelegation and administrative delegation concepts)