Mordi v. Zeigler, 870 F.3d 703

In March 2009, Mordi (a Nigerian national) was stopped on I-57 by State Trooper Zeigler; an officer later called a drug dog, which alerted and led to discovery of crack cocaine; Mordi pleaded guilty to federal drug charges and is serving 120 months.
Mordi filed a pro se § 1983 suit (filed under the prison mailbox rule) alleging among other things racial profiling leading to an illegal traffic stop and unlawful prolongation of the stop to await a canine sniff; his complaint also asserted Vienna Convention claims.
The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed most claims with prejudice, leaving only Vienna Convention claims against three officers.
This court previously held those three officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the Vienna Convention claims and instructed dismissal, leaving Mordi to pursue only other claims (including Fourth Amendment claims against Zeigler and Zerrusen) in the district court.
The district court denied reconsideration of its § 1915A screening order dismissing Mordi’s Fourth Amendment claims as improper under Heck/Preiser and related authorities; the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding the district court erred by dismissing those Fourth Amendment claims at screening.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Mordi can pursue § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims challenging the traffic stop and prolonged detention	Mordi argues the stop was racial profiling and the detention was unlawfully prolonged to await a drug dog; any damages would not invalidate his conviction	State contends the complaint necessarily challenges the conviction and is thus Heck-barred; the Wallace exception should not apply here	Court held the district court erred: Fourth Amendment claims can proceed because they do not necessarily imply invalidity of the conviction
Whether Heck/Preiser bars Mordi’s § 1983 claims given his guilty plea	Mordi says guilty plea does not bar independent Fourth Amendment claims that seek damages and do not disturb conviction	State argues some challenges to searches/detentions can still be treated as attacks on the conviction when they are effectively claims of innocence	Court held Heck does not bar these claims here; Wallace exception applies and any Heck-barred allegations should be severed rather than dismissing the whole complaint

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas is the proper vehicle for challenging fact or duration of confinement)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claims that would invalidate a conviction are barred until conviction is overturned)
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (Fourth Amendment claims generally do not necessarily imply invalidity of conviction and accrue at time of arrest)
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) (guilty plea may preclude Fourth Amendment challenges that would invalidate the plea because the conviction does not rest on seized evidence)
Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing claims that can proceed under § 1983 even if conviction stands; improper to dismiss entire complaint for some Heck-barred content)
Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2003) (claim that is really an assertion of innocence and would erase conviction is Heck-barred)
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) (Heck’s restrictions do not apply where § 1983 claims would not affect conviction or sentence)
Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff is master of complaint; courts look to substance over labels when assessing Heck applicability)