Morales v. Attorney General of the State of Florida
0:16-cv-62311
S.D. Fla.Jun 13, 2017Background
- Morales timely filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 challenging his Broward County sexual battery and lewd molestation convictions.
- The state court record includes the direct appeal, state post-conviction proceedings, and the federal petition (with respondent's answer and petitioner’s reply).
- Ground One challenges trial court error admitting collateral crimes evidence, including officer’s conduct in other cases (Ground One(a)).
- Ground Two asserts ineffective assistance of counsel across several facets: plea-offer advisement (Two), cross-examination strategy (Two a), opening the door to opinion testimony (Two b), failure to call witnesses (Two c), and not advising Petitioner to testify (Two d).
- The court applied 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) standards, concluded some grounds are unexhausted or procedurally barred, and ruled on the merits those claims not barred, denying relief and denying a certificate of appealability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of collateral crimes evidence | Morales contends police-officer collateral-crimes evidence violated due process. | Respondent argues Florida evidentiary rulings govern; federal review limited absent constitutional error. | Ground One(a) denied; not a federal due-process violation; harmless error analysis applied. |
| Effectiveness of counsel re: 18-year plea offer | Counsel misadvised rejecting an 18-year plea; but Petitioner would have accepted if properly advised. | No reasonable probability the plea would have been accepted or outcome changed; record shows awareness and court advised maximum penalty. | Ground Two (plea advice) fails under Strickland; no prejudice established. |
| Effectiveness of counsel re: cross-examination of Napa | Counsel erred by eliciting credibility-damaging details from Napa during cross-examination. | Cross-examination was a reasonable strategic decision under Strickland. | Ground Two (a) fails; no reasonable probability of different outcome. |
| Effectiveness of counsel re: opening the door to opinion testimony | Counsel opened door to the detective’s belief in the victim, infringing on fair trial. | Strategic decision; testimony relevant to defense theory and credibility. | Ground Two (b) fails; not objectively unreasonable. |
| Effectiveness of counsel re: uncalled witnesses Johnny and Justin Reices | Uncalled witnesses could have exonerated Morales. | Testimony would be largely cumulative; speculative to assert impact. | Ground Two (c) fails; no substantial showing of deficient performance or prejudice. |
| Effectiveness of counsel re: advising Morales not to testify | Counsel misadvised him about the consequences of testifying, violating his right to testify. | Right to testify is personal and not violated where counsel advised or allowed decision; no misadvice proven. | Ground Two (d) fails; no credible evidence of misadvice. |
Key Cases Cited
- O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (exhaustion rule; state remedies must be fairly presented)
- Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004) (fair presentation requirement; vague or non-federal framing inadequate)
- Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996) (procedural default can bar federal review; exceptions for procedural bars)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (state remedies exhausted; procedural default doctrine)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (standard for evaluating federal habeas claims under §2254(d))
- Frye v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (plea-bargaining counsel's duties and prejudice under Strickland framework)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice in plea contexts; Strickland prejudice standard applied to plea decisions)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)