359 P.3d 314
Or. Ct. App.2015Background
- Plaintiff slipped on rainwater tracked into a crowded TriMet MAX train and fractured her ankle; there were no standing puddles but the floor was wet.
- TriMet used Tungsten™ slip-resistant flooring and provided handrails; the operator knew the floor was wet but did not warn passengers or remove water.
- Plaintiff sued for negligence alleging TriMet failed to remove or warn of foreign substances (tracked-in rainwater) and failed to barricade wet areas.
- TriMet defended that it had made the train reasonably safe (ordinary care) and alternatively asserted comparative negligence.
- The parties disputed jury instructions: plaintiff sought a UCJI 46.12 foreign-substance-only instruction (no need to prove an unreasonable risk), TriMet sought UCJI 46.09 premises-duty language (requiring unreasonable risk).
- Trial court gave a blended instruction requiring the jury to find TriMet knew of the water and failed to eliminate or warn of an unreasonable risk of harm; jury found TriMet not negligent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | TriMet's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard of care instruction for slip-on-foreign-substance claim | Plaintiff: foreign substances (including tracked-in rainwater) are legally a hazard; plaintiff need only prove TriMet knew of the substance and failed to remove it — no need to prove the substance created an unreasonable risk | TriMet: plaintiff must prove the foreign substance created an unreasonable risk of harm; TriMet may show measures (e.g., slip-resistant flooring) made the premises reasonably safe | Court: affirmed blended instruction using premises-liability principles — plaintiff must prove TriMet knew and failed to eliminate or warn of an unreasonable risk; UCJI 46.12 alone was incomplete here |
| Whether "foreign substance" cases are a distinct category exempt from general premises-duty rules | Plaintiff: foreign-substance rule is a separate duty that does not require proof of an unreasonable condition | TriMet: foreign-substance claims are governed by general premises-liability duty to keep premises reasonably safe | Court: rejected categorical split; foreign-substance cases derive from the overarching duty to maintain premises reasonably safe; jury may decide if substance created unreasonable risk |
| Whether foreign substances are unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law | Plaintiff: tracked-in water is a foreign substance and thus unreasonably dangerous per se | TriMet: whether a foreign substance is unreasonably dangerous is a fact question; safety measures can render floor reasonably safe | Court: held foreign substances are not per se unreasonably dangerous; precedent shows jury may infer slipperiness but owner’s mitigation measures matter |
| Failure to give plaintiff's requested UCJI 46.12 instruction alone | Plaintiff: court erred by refusing her requested instruction limiting elements to knowledge and failure to remove | TriMet: requested instructions must reflect its theory and evidence that no unreasonable risk existed | Court: refusal not error because plaintiff’s instruction omitted the contested element (unreasonable risk) and was incomplete given TriMet’s evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Morrison v. Pacific Nw. Pub. Ser. Co., 146 Or 225 (1934) (transportation-company slip-on-foreign-substance cases apply ordinary-care/premises principles)
- Pribble v. Safeway Stores, 249 Or 184 (1968) (tracked-in rainwater is a foreign substance; owner liability requires knowledge or constructive knowledge)
- Hagler v. Coastal Farm Holdings, Inc., 354 Or 132 (2013) (premises-owner duty to discover or warn of conditions creating unreasonable risk applies across foreign-substance and condition cases)
- Woolston v. Wells, 297 Or 548 (1984) (owner’s general duty is to keep premises reasonably safe for invitees)
- Wilk v. Georges, 267 Or 19 (1973) (if a condition cannot be encountered with reasonable safety even when known, owner must do more than warn and must eliminate the danger)
- De Mars v. Heathman, 132 Or 609 (1930) (foundational principle that liability rests on owner’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of the peril)