Moore v. Texas
139 S. Ct. 666
| SCOTUS | 2019Background
- Bobby James Moore was sentenced to death in Texas; the state habeas court found he had intellectual disability and was ineligible for execution under Atkins v. Virginia.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed (Ex parte Moore I), holding Moore had not proven adaptive deficits; this Court vacated and remanded, criticizing reliance on nonclinical Briseno factors and overemphasis on adaptive strengths and prison-based improvements.
- On remand the Court of Criminal Appeals said it would adopt DSM-5 standards but again concluded Moore was not intellectually disabled (Ex parte Moore II), crediting the State expert and emphasizing conduct and writings in prison.
- Moore petitioned the Supreme Court; the Harris County prosecutor and several amici agreed Moore is intellectually disabled; the Texas Attorney General sought to intervene but was denied.
- The Supreme Court reviewed the record and reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, finding the court repeated the same analytical errors: privileging adaptive strengths (including prison-acquired skills), treating emotional disorders as negating intellectual disability, and in practice continuing to rely on Briseno-like factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Moore meets Atkins elements for intellectual disability (intellectual deficit, adaptive deficits, onset in childhood) | Moore: record shows significant intellectual deficits, pervasive adaptive deficits from childhood, onset before 18, so death ineligible | State/Texas CCA: Moore lacks requisite adaptive deficits; improvements and conduct show sufficient functioning | Court: Moore met the record-based showing of intellectual disability; Texas CCA erred and its judgment reversed |
| Proper role of Briseno factors and lay perceptions in assessing adaptive functioning | Moore: Briseno factors are nonclinical and improper; courts must follow medical diagnostic frameworks (AAIDD, DSM-5) | Texas CCA: Previously relied on Briseno; on remand claimed to abandon Briseno but used Briseno-like reasoning | Court: Briseno factors are unacceptable; Texas CCA continued to apply Briseno-style analysis and erred |
| Reliance on adaptive strengths developed in prison | Moore: Clinicians caution against crediting skills developed in controlled prison settings | State: Prison improvements and pro se filings show adaptive abilities and support non-disability conclusion | Court: Overreliance on prison-based improvements was improper and weakened the appeals court’s analysis |
| Whether comorbid personality or emotional disorders negate intellectual disability | Moore: Presence of personality or mental-health issues does not rule out coexisting intellectual disability | State: Argued deficits stemmed from emotional problems, not intellectual disability | Court: Court of Criminal Appeals wrongly required Moore to disprove emotional causes; comorbid disorders do not preclude intellectual disability |
Key Cases Cited
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding execution of intellectually disabled persons unconstitutional)
- Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) (rejecting rigid IQ cutoff and requiring clinical, evidence-based assessment)
- Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (state evidentiary factors for intellectual disability criticized here as nonclinical and stereotyping)
- Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Texas CCA decision reversing habeas court; vacated and remanded by this Court)
- Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (post-remand Texas CCA decision again finding Moore not intellectually disabled)