Moore v. State
532 S.W.3d 400
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- Victim (12) reported repeated sexual assaults by her cousin, Aaron Moore, when Moore was 16; police and CPS were contacted and an investigation began.
- The investigating detective delayed forwarding the matter to the district attorney for almost two years due to caseload and an erroneous belief that Moore was 17; by the time charges were filed Moore was over 18.
- The State petitioned for discretionary transfer from juvenile court to criminal district court under Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A); the juvenile court found the delay was "for a reason beyond the control of the State" and transferred the case.
- In criminal district court Moore pled guilty and received deferred-adjudication community supervision for five years; he appealed the transfer as improper.
- The court of appeals held that "the State" in § 54.02(j)(4)(A) includes law enforcement and prosecution and that the detective’s delay was not beyond the State’s control, so the juvenile court lacked authority to transfer; the court of appeals vacated the conviction.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed: it agreed "the State" includes law enforcement and prosecutors, rejected separation-of-powers and oppressive-delay challenges, and held the juvenile court erred because the State failed its burden under § 54.02(j)(4)(A).
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument (Petitioner) | Moore's Argument (Respondent) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does "the State" in Tex. Fam. Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A) include law enforcement as well as the prosecutor? | "The State" should be read broadly to include law enforcement and prosecutors; delays by investigators count against the State. | The focus should be on prosecutorial action only; Legislature could have used "prosecuting attorney" if it meant that. | Held: "The State" includes both law enforcement and the prosecution. |
| Must a juvenile-transfer analysis under § 54.02(j)(4)(A) consider constitutional oppressive-delay factors (separation of powers/due process) before dismissing? | The court of appeals wrongly ignored unconstitutional-delay analysis; dismissal-with-prejudice without considering oppressive-delay violates separation of powers. | The statute governs juvenile-court jurisdiction and is a permissible limitation; it does not conflict with separation of powers because it does not set an arbitrary speedy-trial deadline. | Held: § 54.02(j)(4)(A) need not incorporate oppressive-delay factors and does not violate the Separation of Powers Clause. |
| Given the investigative delay here, did the State meet its burden to show it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before Moore turned 18? | The State defends the investigative delay as non-oppressive and argues the juvenile court appropriately found reasons beyond the State's control. | Moore argues the detective’s prolonged caseload and age-mistake were not reasons beyond the State’s control, so transfer was improper. | Held: The State failed its burden; the juvenile court erred in transferring and the court of appeals’ judgment was affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (establishes the principle that "the State" for disclosure obligations includes law enforcement and prosecutors)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (speedy-trial balancing test that weighs state and investigative reasons for delay)
- Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (construing "the State" to include prosecutors and law-enforcement personnel for Brady purposes)
- Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (invalidating a statute that unconstitutionally restricted prosecutorial discretion via mandatory dismissal)
- Ex parte Young, 213 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (separation-of-powers analysis regarding statutory speedy‑trial rules and prosecutorial duties)
- In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1999) (describing juvenile court jurisdiction after the accused turns 18 and the limited options to dismiss or transfer)
- Moore v. State, 446 S.W.3d 47 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (court of appeals’ decision holding the State failed its burden under § 54.02(j)(4)(A))