Moore v. Regents of the University of California
248 Cal. App. 4th 216
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Deborah Moore, Director-level marketing employee at UCSD, began wearing a prescribed external heart monitor (LifeVest) in Sept 2010 and informed her new Executive Director (Kimberly Kennedy) of her heart condition and potential need for brief surgery/leave.
- After Kennedy learned of Moore’s condition, Moore alleges Kennedy removed core duties, reassigned projects, demoted Moore in a restructuring (title change, salary unchanged) and then eliminated Moore’s position in Feb 2011, laying her off.
- UC policies required layoffs by inverse seniority unless a less‑senior employee had unique, necessary skills; Moore was more senior than a retained colleague (Shea) and Kennedy did not document why Shea had unique skills.
- Moore requested FMLA/CFRA paperwork and told Kennedy she likely would need a few days off for surgery; Moore was terminated before taking leave.
- Moore sued under FEHA (disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, FEHA retaliation) and CFRA (interference and retaliation). The trial court granted summary judgment for the Regents; the Court of Appeal reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| FEHA disability discrimination (perceived disability) | Kennedy perceived Moore as disabled after seeing LifeVest and that perception was a substantial factor in termination | Termination was a legitimate reorganization/reduction‑in‑force (no discriminatory motive) | Reversed summary judgment — triable issues of pretext and motive exist (timing, comments about "liability," departures from layoff policy) |
| Failure to accommodate & failure to engage in interactive process (FEHA) | Moore requested short leave for surgery and employer failed to discuss or provide accommodations before termination | No accommodation required because Moore was not disabled; no interactive‑process failure | Reversed — claims viable where employer regarded Moore as disabled and terminated her before engaging in interactive process or granting leave |
| FEHA retaliation ( §12940, subd. (h)) | Notifying employer of condition and requesting leave constituted protected activity | At the time (2011) mere request for accommodation was not protected activity; later statutory amendment (A.B. 987) is prospective | Affirmed summary adjudication for defendant — 2015 amendment is prospective; under pre‑amendment law a mere accommodation request without opposition/complaint was not protected activity |
| CFRA interference & CFRA retaliation | Moore informed Kennedy of need for medical leave (CFRA‑qualifying); termination interfered with/retaliated against exercise of CFRA rights | Moore did not actually exercise CFRA leave or clearly elect CFRA over vacation; legitimate RIF explanation | Reversed summary adjudication as to both: triable issues remain whether Moore gave sufficient notice/exercised CFRA rights, employer met CFRA notice obligations, and whether termination was pretextual |
Key Cases Cited
- Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317 (discusses McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting and employment discrimination framework)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes burden‑shifting framework for discrimination cases)
- Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal.App.4th 34 (employer must accommodate employees it "regards as" disabled; interactive‑process principles)
- Faust v. California Portland Cement Co., 150 Cal.App.4th 864 (CFRA/FMLA notice and interference/retaliation principles)
- Rope v. Auto‑Chlor Sys. of Wash., 220 Cal.App.4th 635 (pre‑2016 view that mere accommodation request is not protected activity for FEHA retaliation)
- Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.) (evidence required to show an affirmative election not to take FMLA leave; relevant to factual inferences about leave intent)