Moore v. Parham
1 CA-CV 15-0603
| Ariz. Ct. App. | Oct 4, 2016Background
- Parham owned a Lake Havasu rental; Mel Allen was the tenant. Moore (Dish Network installer) was injured after climbing a shade structure attached to the house to access the roof.
- Moore sued Parham for negligence, alleging Parham failed to warn of or remedy an unreasonably dangerous shade structure.
- Parham moved for summary judgment, arguing the structure was not unreasonably dangerous and Moore exceeded his invitation by climbing on it.
- Moore produced evidence that Allen directed him to use the shade structure and that others had used it to access the roof; Allen’s version of events differed.
- The superior court granted summary judgment for Parham, concluding the structure was not unreasonably dangerous for its intended use and Moore’s activity was beyond the scope of invitation because Parham had not authorized Allen to permit roof access.
- On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, finding triable issues about foreseeability and breach of the duty to warn or correct hazardous conditions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty and breach | Parham owed invitees reasonable care to warn/repair; he breached by not warning or fixing the structure | No breach because the structure was not unreasonably dangerous for its intended use | Duty existed; whether Parham breached is a jury question because foreseeability is debatable |
| Foreseeability of misuse | Moore: evidence (Allen’s directions, prior use, initial testing) makes climbing foreseeable | Parham: no evidence structure would collapse; misuse not foreseeable | Foreseeability could be found by a jury; summary judgment inappropriate |
| Scope of invitation / implied permission | Moore: Allen directed access via the structure, so Moore was invited to use it | Parham: Allen lacked authority to permit such use; statements not imputed to Parham | Court refused to impute Allen’s statements as agency, but found they are relevant to foreseeability; issue for jury |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment | Moore: genuine factual disputes preclude summary judgment | Parham: facts insufficient to defeat summary judgment | Summary judgment reversed — factual disputes (foreseeability, breach) must be resolved by a jury |
Key Cases Cited
- Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 146 Ariz. 352, 706 P.2d 364 (1985) (duty questions and negligence determinations often reserved for the jury)
- McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc., 231 Ariz. 244, 293 P.3d 520 (App. 2013) (landowner duty to discover/warn of foreseeable dangers to invitees)
- Piccola v. Woodall, 186 Ariz. 307, 921 P.2d 710 (App. 1996) (landlord responsibility to warn tenants/others under certain circumstances)
- Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 150 P.3d 228 (2007) (elements of negligence and duty as a legal question)
- Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 802 P.2d 1000 (1990) (summary judgment standard)
- United Bank of Arizona v. Allyn, 167 Ariz. 191, 805 P.2d 1012 (App. 1990) (summary judgment improper when evidence permits reasonable people to differ)
- Tellez v. Saban, 188 Ariz. 165, 933 P.2d 1233 (App. 1996) (definition of reasonably foreseeable event)