Moore v. Electric Boat Corporation
25f4th30
| 1st Cir. | 2022Background
- Electric Boat built the USS Francis Scott Key in the mid-1960s under Navy contracts; the Navy exercised extensive oversight and control at the Groton shipyard, including supervision of design, construction, safety measures, and warnings.
- Michael J. Moore, a Navy electronics technician assigned to the vessel (1965–1969), later developed lung cancer attributed to asbestos exposure and sued Electric Boat and others in Rhode Island state court.
- Moore pleaded failure to warn, negligence, strict product liability, breach of warranty, conspiracy, and premises-related claims against Electric Boat.
- Electric Boat removed the action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (federal-officer removal). The district court granted remand, applying a ‘‘causal link’’ test and finding removal requirements unmet as to premises/warning claims.
- On appeal, the First Circuit reversed: it held the district court misapplied § 1442 after the 2011 amendment (which added "or relating to"), concluded Electric Boat acted under federal authority and that Moore’s claims "relate to" acts under color of federal office, and found Electric Boat asserted multiple colorable federal defenses (Boyle, Yearsley, combatant-activities exception).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Electric Boat was "acting under" a federal officer for § 1442 removal | Navy did not so control Electric Boat’s conduct/warnings as to make Electric Boat act under Navy authority for these claims | Navy exercised supervision, guidance, and control over shipyard work, warnings, and materials; Electric Boat assisted Navy duties | Electric Boat acting under Navy authority not disputed on appeal; "acting under" satisfied |
| Whether removal requires a causal-link (nexus) between federal direction and plaintiff’s injury | District court: removal requires causal link; Moore endorsed this narrower test for premises claims | § 1442 (post-2011) requires only that claims be "for or relating to" acts under color of office; no strict causal nexus required | First Circuit: 2011 amendment broadened test; no separate causal-link requirement beyond "relating to" |
| Whether premises/failure-to-warn claims "relate to" acts under color of federal office | Moore: premises theory distinct; record does not show Navy barred additional workplace warnings | Navy dictated use of asbestos, workplace safety, and warning postings; claims arise from contract work performed under Navy direction | Claims for failure to warn/premises-related claims are "related to" Electric Boat's performance under Navy authority; removal proper |
| Whether Electric Boat has colorable federal defenses sufficient to sustain removal | Moore argued district court should resolve unresolved facts first; did not identify facts preventing determination | Electric Boat asserted several colorable defenses: government-contractor immunity (Boyle), derivative sovereign immunity (Yearsley), and FTCA combatant-activities exception | Court found multiple colorable federal defenses on the record; requirement satisfied |
Key Cases Cited
- Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (refusing causal-connection test; reading § 1442 "relating to" broadly)
- Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding failure-to-warn claims related to contractor’s performance under Navy directions)
- Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (establishing government-contractor immunity framework)
- Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (derivative sovereign immunity for authorized contractor actions)
- Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969) (colorable federal defense need not be clearly sustainable; threshold is low)
- Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., L.L.C., 979 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2020) (articulating § 1442 requirements: acting under, relating to, and colorable federal defense)
- Watson v. Philip Morris Co., 551 U.S. 142 (2007) (defining "acting under" as assisting or carrying out duties of a federal superior; involves subjection, guidance, or control)
- Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (combatant-activities preemption applies where contractor is integrated into wartime combatant activities)