Moore v. Chicago Park District
2012 IL 112788
| Ill. | 2012Background
- Decedent Sylvia Moore fell in Fernwood Park Fieldhouse parking lot after three inches of snow fell two days earlier and was plowed by the Chicago Park District.
- Decedent entered via a cleared sidewalk path but exited through a different door; her route to the car was blocked by three cars in designated spots.
- She walked between two cars and slipped on plowed asphalt where a five-inch snow pile lay at the edge of the lot, equal to the curb height.
- Decedent fractured her femur, underwent surgery, suffered complications, and died; the estate pursued Survival and Wrongful Death claims.
- The Park District sought summary judgment based on immunity under 3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act; trial court denied it, citing McCuen v. Peoria Park District.
- Appellate court certified the question whether a snow/ice accumulation is a ‘condition’ of public property under 3-106; the appellate court answered negatively.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does an unnatural snow/ice accumulation constitute a condition of public property under 3-106? | Moore contends the accumulation is a condition of property. | Park District argues it is not a property condition but an activity-related danger; or that natural vs unnatural is irrelevant under 3-106. | Yes; the accumulation is a condition of public property under 3-106. |
| Are snow and ice considered a movable/movable condition, not a condition of property, under 3-106? | Snow/ice are movable or passive conditions that can be a property condition. | 3-106 immunity extends to property conditions, not to activities conducted on property. | Snow/ice can be a condition of public property; immunity applies. |
| Does McCuen govern whether liability arises from the property itself or an activity conducted on the property? | In McCuen, the harm came from the activity (negligent snow removal) not the hayrack. | McCuen limits liability where the injury results from an employee’s activity on otherwise safe property. | McCuen supports immunity when the injury is from the property’s condition, not the activity. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCuen v. Peoria Park District, 163 Ill. 2d 125 (1994) (condition of property vs activity analysis for 3-106 immunity)
- Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500 (1997) (movable property/conditions; application of 3-106 to movable items)
- Kayser v. Village of Warren, 303 Ill. App. 3d 198 (1999) (movable item on property immunity under 3-106)
- Rexroad v. City of Springfield, 207 Ill. 2d 33 (2003) (3-106 immunity interplay with 3-102; misplacement/movable items)
- Stein v. Chicago Park District, 323 Ill. App. 3d 574 (2001) (hose not part of property; 3-106 applicability limit)
- Callaghan v. Village of Clarendon Hills, 401 Ill. App. 3d 287 (2010) (rejects Stein limitation; supports broader 3-106 scope)
- Grundy v. Lincoln Park Zoo, 2011 IL App (1st) 102686 (2011) (movable items/conditions; 3-106 immunity extent)