372 F. Supp. 3d 690
C.D. Ill.2019Background
- Plaintiff Stacey Mooney, a long‑time Illinois public school teacher and non‑union member, was required under Illinois law to pay “fair‑share” fees to teachers’ unions and seeks reimbursement after Janus.
- Mooney sued union defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking refunds of pre‑Janus fair‑share fees and also alleged various state‑law claims.
- Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting an affirmative good‑faith defense to § 1983 liability and arguing the federal Janus claim fails; they also sought dismissal of any Abood‑based and state‑law claims.
- The court treated parts of the motion as a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings and considered authority from multiple circuits and district courts on the good‑faith defense.
- The court concluded (1) a good‑faith affirmative defense is available to private parties sued under § 1983, (2) defendants here acted in good faith relying on Abood and Illinois statutes, and (3) Mooney’s Janus refund claim is barred and dismissed with prejudice.
- The court dismissed any standalone Abood claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state‑law claims, dismissing them without prejudice and allowing limited leave to replead the Abood claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Existence of a good‑faith defense for private § 1983 defendants | No explicit statutory text; defense is not available | Common‑law and circuit precedent support a good‑faith affirmative defense | Court: Good‑faith affirmative defense exists for some private § 1983 defendants |
| Applicability of good‑faith defense to refund claims for pre‑Janus fair‑share fees | Janus entitles nonmembers to recover fees paid before Janus; refunds are appropriate | Defendants acted in objective and subjective good faith relying on Abood/statute; defense bars refund liability | Court: Defense applies here; Janus claim for retrospective refunds dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether good‑faith defense requires analogy to a common‑law scienter tort (e.g., conversion) | Must look to most analogous tort; conversion (strict liability) precludes defense | No necessity to import a particular common‑law analog; defense serves fairness where defendants relied on then‑binding precedent | Court: No inquiry into an 1871 tort analog required; scienter analog test unnecessary |
| Abood‑based claim alleging unlawful use of fees for political expenditures | Mooney separately pleaded Abood violation and seeks refund of politically spent fees | Defendants contend no factual allegations show such misuse; any Abood claim is pleaded inadequately | Court: Abood claim dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead sufficient facts; Mooney may replead within 21 days |
Key Cases Cited
- Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) (discusses whether private defendants may assert good‑faith defense under § 1983)
- Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (upheld agency‑shop fair‑share fees prior to being overruled)
- Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (held mandatory fair‑share fees by public employers violate the First Amendment)
- Gilpin v. AFSCME, AFL‑CIO, 875 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1989) (restitution principle: unions provided services that could justify fee retention)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity principles and rationale)
- Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability limited to official policy; distinct treatment of municipal entities)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (judicial duty to say what the law is)