Montin v. Estate of Johnson, 636 F.3d 409

Montin was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity in 1993 and has been involuntarily committed at the Lincoln Regional Center since 1994.
Center policy changes in 1996 and again in 1998 restricted residents' liberty, ultimately eliminating Code-4 and Code-5 and leaving Montin at Code-3.
Before 1996, Montin enjoyed Code-4 privileges; after the 1998 change, he no longer had Code-4 or Code-5 rights.
In 2007, Montin filed §1983 claims alleging due process and equal protection violations regarding ongoing confinement and policy restrictions; he sought damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.
The district court dismissed as untimely, ruling accrual occurred in 1998 and that Montin’s insanity did not toll the limitations period; the case was appealed and remanded for further proceedings.
The appellate panel vacated and remanded to address equitable tolling and the continuing-violations issue, with consideration of additional evidence on remand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Equitable tolling under Neb. §25-213 applies to Montin’s mental-disability tolling.	Montin argues he qualifies under §25-213 as mentally disabled.	Defendants contend tolling is not warranted; evidence insufficient.	Remand necessary to resolve factual questions on tolling.
Entitlement to tolling based on involuntary commitment status.	Involuntary commitment supports tolling as a matter of law.	Not clearly established; district court should decide.	No decision on merits; remand for district court determination.
Continuing-violations doctrine applies to injunctive relief and ongoing confinement.	Each day of ongoing restriction constitutes a new violation.	Accrual governs; continuing-violation theory uncertain.	Court leaves merits for district court; remand to address continuing-violation theory.
Accrual date for the §1983 claim in context of ongoing liberties.	Ongoing deprivation may render accrual at multiple points.	Accrual tied to specific policy change; ongoing relief not precluded.	Remand to determine accrual timing on remand.

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (accrual timing for §1983; federal law governs accrual; tolling governed by state law)
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989) (state-law tolling governs equitable tolling in §1983 actions)
Kraft v. St. John Lutheran Church, 414 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (defines ‘mental disorder’ for tolling under §25-213)
Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2008) (reiterates remedies for deciding tolling; evidentiary hearing considerations)
Melendez-Arroyo v. Cutler-Hammer de P.R. Co., 273 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2001) (hearing on equitable tolling—court may decide on remand)
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (continuing-violation concept; each day can be a continuing wrong)
Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cnty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1997) (application of continuing-violations theory in due process context)
Va. Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 868 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1989) (continuing enforcement cannot be insulated by statute of limitations)