Montgomery v. Louisiana
136 S. Ct. 718
| SCOTUS | 2016Background
- In 1963 Henry Montgomery (age 17) killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana; after retrial he was convicted and automatically sentenced to life without parole under state law that mandated that sentence on the jury's verdict.
- Montgomery spent decades in prison and after this Court decided Miller v. Alabama (2012) sought collateral relief in Louisiana courts, arguing Miller rendered his mandatory life-without-parole sentence unconstitutional.
- Louisiana trial and supreme courts denied relief, holding Miller is not retroactive on state collateral review; Montgomery petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide (1) whether Miller announced a new substantive rule that must be given retroactive effect on collateral review, and (2) whether the Court had jurisdiction to review the Louisiana Supreme Court's refusal to give Miller retroactive effect.
- The Court held that (a) it has jurisdiction because a state court’s refusal to apply a controlling constitutional rule can implicate federal law, and (b) Miller announced a substantive rule that, under the Constitution, must be applied retroactively in collateral review of state sentences.
- Remedy: The Court explained States may cure Miller violations by allowing juvenile homicide offenders parole consideration (or other proceedings consistent with Miller) rather than necessarily vacating convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the Court have jurisdiction to review Louisiana Supreme Court's refusal to apply Miller retroactively? | Montgomery: Yes — refusal to apply a controlling constitutional rule in state collateral proceedings implicates federal law and is reviewable. | Louisiana/amicus: No — States control their collateral procedures; retroactivity on state collateral review is a matter of state law not federal review. | Court: Yes — when federal constitutional law requires retroactivity, state courts cannot refuse relief; Supremacy Clause permits review. |
| Is Miller a substantive rule (retroactive) or a procedural rule (nonretroactive) under Teague? | Montgomery: Miller is substantive because it prohibits imposing life without parole on a class of juvenile offenders (all but the rare irreparably corrupt), eliminating state power to impose that punishment. | Louisiana: Miller is procedural because it prescribes a process (consider youth) for sentencers rather than categorically barring the penalty. | Court: Miller announced a substantive rule (although it has procedural components) and thus must be given retroactive effect on collateral review. |
| What is the scope of relief required when Miller is retroactive? | Montgomery: Retroactivity entitles affected prisoners to relief — opportunity to show they are not irreparably corrupt; release or resentencing/parole eligibility as appropriate. | Louisiana: Retroactivity would disrupt finality and state sentencing systems; relief is not constitutionally required on state collateral review. | Court: States may remedy Miller violations by e.g., making juvenile homicide offenders eligible for parole or providing sentencing review; full resentencing is not mandated. |
| Do Teague and Danforth prevent federal review or state obligation to apply Miller retroactively? | Montgomery: Teague’s substantive-rule exception rests on constitutional premises and thus binds states; Danforth does not foreclose that question. | Louisiana/Scalia dissent: Teague is statutory/interpretive of federal habeas and does not create a constitutional mandate for state collateral review; Danforth allows states greater retroactivity than Teague. | Court: Teague’s rule that substantive new rules are retroactive is grounded in constitutional principles and therefore state collateral courts must give retroactive effect to such substantive rules. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (capital punishment unconstitutional for juveniles; children are constitutionally different)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment bars life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. _ (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates Eighth Amendment) (central case under review)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity in federal habeas; substantive-rule exception)
- Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (expanded substantive-rule concept to punishment categories for classes of defendants)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (clarifies substantive rules are not subject to Teague bar)
- Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (new rules apply retroactively to cases on direct review)
- United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) (cases involving conduct constitutionally immune from punishment warrant complete retroactivity)
- Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880) (convictions under unconstitutional statutes viewed as void; historical support for retroactivity of substantive prohibitions)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (explains when a new rule carries significant risk that defendant faces a punishment the law cannot impose)