Montgomery County v. Butler
417 Md. 271
Md.2010Background
- Butler operated a landscape contracting business from a 2.68-acre rural lot in Montgomery County's Rural Density Transfer (RDT) zone without a required special exception.
- Landscape contracting is allowed in the RDT zone only via a Montgomery County special exception, per §59-C-9.3(c).
- Butler sought a special exception in 2007; the local Planning Board recommended denial or approval with conditions, while one division suggested denial with conditions.
- The zoning hearing examiner recommended denial; the Board of Appeals denied Butler’s application by a 3-1 vote citing non-inherent adverse effects.
- Butler challenged the Board’s denial in circuit court, which reversed, and the County and Weeks appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May the County amend its zoning standards to differ from Schultz-based analysis? | Butler: CountyCode definitions clash with Schultz; must follow Schultz. | Montgomery County: Legislature may legislate a different framework. | County may legislate as it did; held for reversal and affirmance of Board. |
| Was there substantial evidence of non-inherent adverse effects to deny the special exception? | Butler: no non-inherent effects proven by the record. | Butler: evidence supports non-inherent effects from site configuration. | Yes; substantial evidence supports denial based on non-inherent effects. |
| How does the presumption of compatibility apply under the County Code versus Schultz? | Butler: presumption of compatibility from Schultz should control. | County: presumption derives from local ordinance and police power; not bound to Schultz. | County could apply its own framework; Schultz not controlling where not unambiguous. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 (1981) (established Schultz framework for inherent vs non-inherent effects)
- Loyola College in Maryland v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 406 Md. 54 (2008) (clarified role of Schultz and site-specific analysis)
- Merlands Club, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 202 Md. 279 (1953) (origin of presumptive propriety of special exceptions)
- Gilmor v. Mayor of Baltimore, 205 Md. 557 (1954) (early articulation of special exception presumptions)
- Oursler v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 204 Md. 397 (1954) (early zoning appeal standards informing presumptions)
- Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 107 Md.App. 1 (1995) (impetus for legislative amendment on evaluating adverse effects)
- Gotach Center for Health v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Frederick County, 60 Md.App. 477 (1984) (recognized ability to adopt a different standard in ordinance)
- Preston v. Harford County, 322 Md. 493 (1991) (clarified malleability of local standards)
- Harford County v. Earl E. Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493 (1991) (context for application of special exception standards)
- Wells v. Pierpont, 253 Md. 554 (1969) (recognizes presumption related to special exceptions under certain tests)