Monson v. The City of Danville
80 N.E.3d 87
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On Dec. 7, 2012, Barbara Monson tripped on an uneven seam between two downtown sidewalk slabs in Danville and was injured; she sued the City alleging negligence and willful and wanton conduct.
- The City’s downtown superintendent (Larson) inspected and marked sidewalk areas for repair; the public works director (Ahrens) made final repair decisions based on multiple, non‑codified factors (case‑by‑case discretion).
- Ahrens led a 2011 downtown enhancement project inspecting slabs and exercised discretion in deciding which slabs to repair; the deviation at the fall site was under two inches.
- The City moved for summary judgment asserting discretionary‑function immunity under 745 ILCS 10/2‑109 and 2‑201; trial court granted summary judgment relying on Richter.
- The trial court found Ahrens’ actions were policy determinations and discretionary (not ministerial), so the City was immune; Monson appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether section 3‑102 (duty to maintain property) controls, precluding discretionary immunity | Monson: section 3‑102’s maintenance duty and notice exceptions supersede sections 2‑109/2‑201, so immunity doesn’t apply | City: Ahrens’ decisions were discretionary policy determinations triggering sections 2‑109/2‑201 immunity, so Article III (3‑102) is not applicable | Court: Affirmed City immunity under 2‑109/2‑201; 3‑102 does not supplant discretionary‑function immunity when actions are policy/discretionary |
| Whether Ahrens’ sidewalk decisions were ministerial (no discretion) or discretionary (policy) | Monson: repairs/maintenance involve ministerial duties and notice could negate immunity | City: decisions used multi‑factor, non‑mandatory criteria developed over years, thus discretionary | Court: Actions were discretionary/policy determinations — immunity applies |
| Whether actual or constructive notice of the defect negates immunity | Monson: City had notice (inspection/photos) so 3‑102 applies | City: Even with notice, if a policy maker inspected and chose inaction, 2‑109/2‑201 still immunize the entity | Court: Not required to decide notice; immunity under 2‑109 stands even if official had notice |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate | Monson: disputed factual issues (notice, obviousness, degree of deviation) preclude summary judgment | City: record (depositions/affidavit) shows undisputed discretion/policy making; no material fact defeats immunity | Court: Summary judgment for City affirmed (de novo review) |
Key Cases Cited
- Richter v. College of Du Page, 3 N.E.3d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (upheld discretionary immunity where building director set policy and exercised discretion on sidewalk deviations)
- Kennel v. Clayton Township, 606 N.E.2d 812 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts under the Act)
- Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 799 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. 2003) (Act protects local entities for governmental/discretionary functions; dual‑pronged inquiry for 2‑201)
- Hascall v. Williams, 996 N.E.2d 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (municipality retains immunity for negligent or willful/wanton discretionary acts under 2‑201)
- Courson v. Danville Sch. Dist. No. 118, 704 N.E.2d 447 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (reversed summary judgment where alleged omission was not shown to be discretionary)
- Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959) (historical background: elimination of common‑law immunity precipitating legislative response)
- Hooker v. Retirement Bd. of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 4 N.E.3d 15 (Ill. 2013) (statutory interpretation and summary judgment are reviewed de novo)