Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL 122486

Background

On Dec. 7, 2012, Barbara Monson tripped on an uneven seam in a downtown Danville sidewalk and sued the City for negligence and willful/wanton conduct. She alleged the City failed to maintain, repair, or warn of the dangerous condition.
The City had conducted a downtown sidewalk inspection/repair project in 2011–2012; Public Works Director Ahrens performed a walk-through, made final repair decisions, and later could not recall inspecting or deciding specifically about the slab where Monson fell.
Ahrens submitted an affidavit stating, to his knowledge, the slabs at issue were either not prioritized for replacement or could not fit within the project’s time/budget, and he used his discretion not to replace them.
The City moved for summary judgment asserting discretionary immunity under 745 ILCS 10/2-201 and related section 2-109; the trial court granted summary judgment on immunity; the appellate court affirmed.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed: it held the City failed to meet its burden to show the specific acts were discretionary as a matter of law and that genuine issues of fact remained on whether the sidewalk defect was de minimis. The case was remanded for further proceedings and for the trial court to consider the City’s alternative open-and-obvious defense.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §2-201 discretionary immunity bars Monson’s claim	Monson: §3-102 (duty re: public property) governs and limits immunity; §3-102 should control over general §2-201 immunity	City: §2-201 and §2-109 provide absolute discretionary immunity for policy/exercise-of-discretion decisions about repairs	The City failed to prove, as a matter of law, that its handling of the specific slab was a conscious exercise of discretion; summary judgment on §2-201 immunity reversed and remanded
Whether §3-102(a) is an immunity that supersedes §2-201	Monson: §3-102(a) functions as the specific immunity/duty provision and thus overrides §2-201	City: §3-102 merely codifies the common-law duty and does not displace §2-201 immunity	Court: §3-102(a) codifies duty and contains notice element; it does not by text eliminate §2-201, so it does not automatically supersede §2-201; but §2-201 immunity still requires proof that a discretionary decision was actually made as to the specific defect
Whether §3-102’s “except as otherwise provided in this Article” limits available immunities to article III only	Monson: phrase means article III immunities govern property-maintenance claims, not §2-201 in article II	City: §2-201 still applies despite article placement	Court: phrase limits scope of the duty in §3-102, not the universe of immunities; it does not preclude §2-201, so article placement alone doesn’t bar §2-201—but City must still prove a conscious discretionary decision about the specific defect
Whether the sidewalk defect was de minimis (alternative basis)	Monson: defect may have been > minimal and in commercial area; factual dispute exists	City: defect was slight/de minimis and not actionable	Court: photos and record do not establish the discrepancy was so minimal that no danger could be foreseen; genuine fact issues exist—cannot decide de minimis on summary judgment

Key Cases Cited

Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (recognition of the context for the Tort Immunity Act)
Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 207 Ill. 2d 359 (defendant bears burden to prove discretionary immunity)
Murray v. Chicago Youth Ctr., 224 Ill. 2d 213 (§2-201 immunity contingent on other statutory provisions)
Wagner v. City of Chicago, 166 Ill. 2d 144 (§3-102 codifies common-law duty; immunities provided in other sections)
Snyder v. Curran Twp., 167 Ill. 2d 466 (distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts; strict construction against entity seeking immunity)
In re Chicago Flood Litig., 176 Ill. 2d 179 (discretionary acts can include repair decisions depending on facts)
Adams v. N. Ill. Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32 (summary judgment standards)
Arvidson v. City of Elmhurst, 11 Ill. 2d 601 (de minimis rule for sidewalk deviations)