Monroe v. Indiana Department of Transportation
871 F.3d 495
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Monroe worked 21+ years as an INDOT night-shift unit foreman supervising ~18 employees; he reported stress and sought a day-shift transfer in Dec 2012–Jan 2013.
- On Jan 24, 2013 Monroe had a heated incident with crew members; the next day 7–8 subordinates complained to supervisors about his repeated hostile, demeaning, and intimidating conduct (including targeting an employee with a hearing impairment).
- INDOT investigated (interviewing current and former employees); multiple witnesses described consistent hostile and intimidating behavior over months; Monroe disclosed a provisional PTSD diagnosis during the investigatory meetings.
- On Feb 4, 2013 INDOT terminated Monroe for "consistently exhibiting hostile and intimidating behavior." Monroe sued under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act claiming disability-based discharge and failure to accommodate; he did not press the accommodation claim on appeal.
- The district court granted summary judgment for INDOT; on appeal Monroe argued (1) INDOT’s stated reason was pretextual and (2) non-disabled comparators were treated more favorably. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether INDOT’s proffered reason (hostile/intimidating conduct) was pretext for disability discrimination | Monroe: positive prior evaluations, minor inconsistencies in INDOT statements, and decisionmakers’ discussion of his PTSD show pretext | INDOT: extensive investigation produced many corroborating complaints; discrepancies are minor and employer honestly believed the misconduct | Held: No genuine dispute—issues do not show a phony reason; employer honestly believed the nondiscriminatory basis for discharge |
| Whether similarly situated non-disabled employees were treated better | Monroe: points to Patrick, Wilson, Branson who were not fired for misconduct | INDOT: comparators differ materially (sparse evidence for Patrick; misconduct occurred pre-2011 policy change for Patrick/Wilson; Branson’s incidents were isolated and less prolonged) | Held: Comparators not similarly situated; cannot raise inference of discrimination |
| Causation standard and burden to survive summary judgment | Monroe: argues discharge was "on the basis of" his disability | INDOT: applies existing Seventh Circuit "but-for" causation standard; no direct evidence of discharge because of disability | Held: Court applies "but-for" standard (as parties did) and finds insufficient evidence that disability was the but-for cause of termination |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor-Novotny v. Health Alliance Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for summary judgment in employment cases)
- Bunn v. Khoury Enter., Inc., 753 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014) (circumstantial/direct methods and examples of evidence to show discrimination)
- Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010) ("but-for" causation requirement for ADA discharge claims)
- Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 2016) (discusses ADA causation and amendments)
- Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 2015) (method-of-proof discussion in ADA context)
- Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (pretext requires more than mistaken judgment; must show a lie)
- Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2012) (employer’s honest belief doctrine in pretext analysis)
- Felix v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., 828 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2016) (employer may discipline for misconduct even if precipitated by disability)
- Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005) (prior evaluations do not alone defeat discharge supported by later evidence)
- Lane v. Riverview Hosp., 835 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2016) (minor EEOC-statement errors insufficient to infer discriminatory intent)
- Burks v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2006) (similarly situated comparator standard)
- Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (focus on whether evidence as a whole permits inference that protected trait caused discharge)
