546 S.W.3d 718
Tex. App.2018Background
- Appellant Billy Ray Monreal was convicted by a jury of intentionally and knowingly causing Eugene Sanchez’s death by shooting; sentenced to 40 years. Appellant does not challenge sufficiency of evidence.
- At trial defense theory: Edward Morales was the shooter; multiple defense witnesses and appellant testified to Morales’s role. Appellant’s indictment did not charge the other wounded victim.
- Post-trial, appellant raised a motion for new trial alleging (inter alia) ineffective assistance for failure to call two witnesses, exclusion of family members from voir dire, juror discussion of parole law, and improper removal (and non-return) of appellant from the courtroom.
- Trial court held a new-trial hearing with testimony from trial counsel, two jurors, the jury foreman, the bailiff, appellant’s relatives, and an investigator; the court denied the motion.
- On appeal, the court reviewed denial of the motion for new trial for abuse of discretion and applied Strickland for ineffective-assistance claims; Supreme Court precedent in Weaver governs courtroom-closure prejudice when raised via ineffective-assistance claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Monreal) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ineffective assistance for failing to call two witnesses (Brandon Monreal, Edward Morales) | Counsel was deficient for not calling Brandon (would have testified Morales admitted shooting) and Morales | Morales availability not shown; multiple defense witnesses already testified Morales was shooter; no prejudice shown | Denied — no ineffective assistance: Morales unavailable; no Strickland prejudice shown as many witnesses supported the same theory |
| 2. Family excluded from courtroom during voir dire (public-trial violation) — raised as ineffective-assistance | Counsel ineffective for not objecting when family barred; structural error requires reversal | Under Weaver, when raised via ineffective-assistance, defendant must show Strickland prejudice or fundamental unfairness; no such showing here | Denied — Weaver controls; no reasonable probability of different outcome and not fundamentally unfair; separate stand-alone closure claim not preserved for appeal |
| 3. Juror discussion of parole and exclusion of juror interview recordings at new-trial hearing | Parole discussion influenced punishment; recordings of juror interviews were prior inconsistent statements and should have been admitted for impeachment | Recordings not admissible under Rule 613; if error, it is nonconstitutional and harmless | Denied — trial court did not abuse discretion under Sneed test; no showing juror misstatement as law by one professing legal knowledge that caused juror vote change; any error harmless |
| 4. Removal of appellant from courtroom during punishment and refusal to allow return | Appellant argues the court erred by not allowing him to return after removal | Removal for disruptive conduct was warranted; trial judge offered to return him; defense counsel declined return — effectively waived | Denied — removal was within court's discretion; appellant’s counsel waived right to return by declining to have him brought back |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two-prong test)
- Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017) (when courtroom-closure claim is raised as ineffective-assistance, defendant must show Strickland prejudice or that closure rendered trial fundamentally unfair)
- Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (public-trial right extends to jury voir dire)
- Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (public-trial violations are structural errors when preserved at trial)
- Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (standard for abuse-of-discretion review of denial of new trial)
- King v. State, 649 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (defendant must show witness availability and benefit from testimony to prove counsel ineffective for not calling witness)
- Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (parole discussion improper; remedies governed by Sneed factors)
- Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (five-part test for reversible error from juror statements about parole)