Monitronics International, Inc. v. Veasley
323 Ga. App. 126
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Veasley sued Monitronics for negligence after a home intruder assaulted her; Monitronics moved for j.n.o.v., to enforce a liability limit, and for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
- The contract Veasley bought from Tel-Star (assigned to Monitronics) included a $250 liability cap and a broad limitation of damages; Veasley pursued tort theories rather than contract claim.
- Alarms triggered on March 29, 2006 showed multiple alerts; Monitronics repeatedly failed to contact Veasley or key-holders promptly, and police were eventually notified but not met promptly.
- Veasley returned home unaware of the day’s alarms and was attacked; evidence showed Monitronics gave misleading reasons for the alarm and did not fully disclose alarm history.
- Trial focused on extra-contractual duties arising from Monitronics’ phone contact and adherence to industry standards; the court ruled the contract claim would not be tried, and the jury found Monitronics liable on tort theory.
- The jury allocated 96% fault to Monitronics and 4% to Veasley, awarded $9,000,000 in damages (later reduced to $8,640,000 by fault apportionment), and found no gross negligence or punitive damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether genuine issues preclude j.n.o.v. on extra-contractual negligence | Veasley argues Monitronics owed an extra-contractual duty and proximate cause supported the verdict. | Monitronics claims no duty beyond the contract and no causation. | No error; jury could find an extra-contractual duty and proximate cause. |
| Enforceability of the limitation-of-liability clause | Veasley contends the clause is unenforceable due to unconscionability/public policy. | Monitronics argues the clause limits liability and is enforceable. | Clause unenforceable on contract-interpretation grounds; contract-based duty not barred. |
| Striking notices of apportionment as untimely | Veasley argues notices were timely or not strictly required to be earlier. | Monitronics contends notices were untimely under OCGA 51-12-33(d)(1). | Struck; trial court did not abuse discretion; strict 120-day rule applied. |
| Assumption of the risk instruction | Veasley contends no instruction was needed because evidence did not show specific knowledge of risk violation. | Monitronics requested pattern instruction on assumption of risk. | denial of instruction was proper; no evidence of specific knowledge of risk by Veasley. |
| Jury instruction on industry standards | Veasley asserts Monitronics violated industry standards; trial court should instruct accordingly. | Monitronics contends industry-standard guidance is not a legal duty. | Instruction on industry standards proper; no reversible error given verdict findings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Parkside Ctr., Ltd. v. Chicagoland Vending, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 607 (2001) (exculpatory clauses must be explicit, prominent, clear and unambiguous)
- Leland Indus., Inc. v. Suntek Indus., Inc., 184 Ga. App. 635 (1987) (prominence/formatting affects enforceability of exculpatory clauses)
- Holmes v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 474 (2007) (private industry standards admissible; general duty to exercise reasonable care)
- Hayes v. Crawford, 317 Ga. App. 75 (2012) (proximate cause jury question; evidence supports jury findings)
- Parkhill Trust Fund, Inc. v. Carroll, 115 Ga. App. 108 (1967) (exculpatory clauses require clear language to exculpate negligence)