Monique Montrice Franklin v. City of Franklin Department of Social Services, 2030163

Background

In April 2015 Franklin voluntarily placed her two-year-old daughter M. with Lynchburg DSS because she felt overwhelmed and feared harming the child; DSS removed M. and placed her in foster care.
DSS identified Franklin’s mental health (anxiety, personality traits) and limited intellectual functioning as the primary conditions leading to placement and offered multiple services: three evaluations, individual counseling (two therapists), parenting coaching, visitation (progressing to overnight), and assistance obtaining support services; medication was eventually prescribed in May–June 2016 but Franklin initially refused and only recently began a different medication.
Psychological testing (Dr. Anderson) showed a WAIS score of 69, diagnoses including mixed anxiety/depressive disorder and personality traits (narcissistic, histrionic, schizoid/avoidant), and poor parenting-assessment results; he opined substantial progress would take a year or more and improvement was uncertain.
The JDR court approved permanency plans (goal: adoption) and ordered termination under Va. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2); Franklin appealed to the circuit court, which conducted a de novo termination hearing in November 2016.
The circuit court found DSS had provided reasonable and appropriate services, Franklin had not substantially remedied the conditions within a reasonable time (statutory 12-month benchmark), and additional delay was not in M.’s best interests; the court terminated Franklin’s residual parental rights.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether DSS provided reasonable and appropriate services under Code § 16.1‑283(C)(2)	Franklin: DSS’s services were inadequate to address her mental‑health and parenting needs (and she needed more autism‑specific supports for M.)	DSS: Offered multiple evaluations, therapy (including a change of therapist), parenting coaching, visitation progression, and medication assistance—services tailored to identified needs	Court: DSS provided reasonable and appropriate services; termination supported by evidence
Whether the 12‑month period in § 16.1‑283(C)(2) violated due process / whether the court erred by denying more time for medication to take effect	Franklin: She had only recently begun psychiatric medication; the court should have continued the case to allow medication to work	DSS: Even with medication, substantial improvement was speculative given Franklin’s intellectual and personality limitations and expert opinion that progress would likely take a year+	Court: Refusal to continue was not an abuse of discretion; 12‑month framework is a reasonable statutory limit and extension was unwarranted given low likelihood of timely improvement

Key Cases Cited

Boatright v. Wise Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 64 Va. App. 71, 764 S.E.2d 724 (Va. Ct. App.) (appellate review view evidence for prevailing party and reasonable inferences)
Thach v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 Va. App. 157, 754 S.E.2d 922 (Va. Ct. App.) (circuit courts have broad discretion in child welfare decisions)
Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 616 S.E.2d 765 (Va. Ct. App.) (presumption that circuit court weighed evidence and acted in child’s best interest)
Weaver v. Roanoke Dep’t of Human Res., 220 Va. 921, 265 S.E.2d 692 (Va.) (termination improper absent evidence of reasonable and appropriate agency efforts)
L.G. v. Amherst Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 41 Va. App. 51, 581 S.E.2d 886 (Va. Ct. App.) (12‑month rule prevents foster‑care drift; provides presumptive timeframe)
Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 394 S.E.2d 492 (Va. Ct. App.) (child’s interest in avoiding prolonged uncertainty)
Edwards v. Cty. of Arlington, 5 Va. App. 294, 361 S.E.2d 644 (Va. Ct. App.) (trial court may continue case to allow further services)
Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 456 S.E.2d 538 (Va. Ct. App.) (statute balances parental rights and timely resolution for child)