Monica Rogers v. Henry Ford Health Sys.
897 F.3d 763
6th Cir.2018Background
- Monica Rogers, an African-American HFHS employee with ~30 years’ service, sought reclassification from OHRD Consultant to Senior OHRD Consultant after performing higher-level duties; job required a master’s degree. She lacked a college degree. HFHS denied reclassification after an internal review.
- Rogers filed an EEOC charge alleging racial discrimination; months later co-workers reported concerns about her erratic behavior and potential safety risk.
- HFHS placed Rogers on paid leave, required a fitness-for-duty exam; a physician cleared her to return.
- After clearance, HFHS (through Derick Adams) presented Rogers options (per Rogers: transfer to HAP or severance); she transferred to HAP and remained employed there.
- Rogers sued under § 1981, Title VII, and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act alleging race discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation. District court granted summary judgment for HFHS; Sixth Circuit affirmed on race and age claims, reversed and remanded on retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Racial discrimination (failure to reclassify) | Rogers performed Senior duties and HFHS waived education for others, so she was qualified and treated worse because she is black | HFHS: Rogers lacked required education (master’s) and no similarly situated non-black employee was given a two-level educational waiver | Affirmed for HFHS — Rogers failed to show she was qualified for reclassification or a proper comparator |
| Retaliation (placement on leave, fitness exam, transfer) | Actions occurred soon after EEOC charge, cumulative measures were materially adverse, and transfer was motivated by retaliation (Adams sought to give her “space” because of her EEOC charge) | HFHS: actions were non-retaliatory responses to coworkers’ reports about Rogers’s erratic and potentially dangerous behavior | Reversed for Rogers — prima facie established; factual disputes (esp. motive for transfer) create triable issue of pretext |
| Age discrimination | (Not argued substantively on appeal) | HFHS: summary judgment appropriate | Affirmed — claim waived for failure to defend below/on appeal |
| Standard for materially adverse action in retaliation claims | Plaintiff relied on Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White test (reasonable employee deterred) | Same standard argued by court/defendant; disagreement was over significance of specific actions | Court applied Burlington standard and found material adversity could be shown by the cumulative actions |
Key Cases Cited
- Schleicher v. Preferred Sols., Inc., 831 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (drawing inferences for nonmoving party at summary judgment)
- Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 1999) (treating § 1981 and state-law race claims under Title VII standards)
- Kuhn v. Washtenaw Cty., 709 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2013) (same standard for § 1981 and Elliott-Larsen Act claims)
- Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2001) (race-discrimination and retaliation standards)
- Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2009) (direct vs. circumstantial evidence and McDonnell Douglas framework)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination evidence)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation materially adverse test: would reasonable employee be dissuaded)
- Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007) (cumulative employment actions may be materially adverse)