Monica Galvan v. State
13-14-00059-CR
| Tex. App. | Oct 19, 2015Background
- Appellant Monica Galvan (formerly Manka) was convicted of an offense based on alleged reckless conduct causing a motor-vehicle collision; she appeals, arguing the evidence was legally insufficient to prove recklessness.
- At trial there was evidence she had consumed two to three alcoholic drinks and possibly a mixer shot earlier the night; she later ate at Whataburger.
- There is no evidence she was speeding, violating traffic laws, or otherwise driving erratically; she was acquitted of intoxication assault.
- Witnesses indicated there had been an argument in the vehicle moments before the accident, but no direct proof she actually foresaw and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
- Appellant relies on the Court of Criminal Appeals’ definition of recklessness as requiring actual foresight and conscious disregard of risk (a “devil-may-care” mindset), arguing her conduct does not meet that standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved criminal recklessness (actual awareness & conscious disregard of a substantial/unjustifiable risk) | Galvan: evidence only shows limited alcohol consumption and an argument; no proof she actually foresaw or consciously disregarded a serious risk | State: (implied) circumstantial evidence of drinking and pre-crash conduct supports a jury finding of recklessness | Court viewed controlling law to require actual awareness; Galvan argues evidence insufficient to show conscious disregard and seeks reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (defines recklessness as requiring actual foresight and conscious disregard of risk)
- Rubio v. State, 203 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App. 2007) (upheld recklessness conviction where extreme intoxication and speed supported conscious disregard)
- Arellano v. State, 54 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App. 2001) (speeding well over limit and ignoring warnings supported recklessness)
- Newman v. State, 49 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App. 2001) (speeding and driving in wrong lane supported reckless finding)
- Gill v. State, 981 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App. 1998) (speeding alone not necessarily reckless; speeding while intoxicated can be reckless)
- Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (extreme speeding and dangerous passing supported conviction)
- LaSalle v. State, 973 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App. 1998) (speeding and disregarding stop signs upheld as reckless)
- Trapanier v. State, 940 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App. 1997) (dangerous lane changes and passing leading to collision supported recklessness)
- Porter v. State, 969 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App. 1998) (impairment from substances and concealment of drug paraphernalia relevant to culpability)
- Banister v. State, 761 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App. 1988) (illegal driving against traffic in foggy conditions supported culpability)