Moncrief Oil International, Inc. v. Oao Gazprom, Gazprom Export, LLC, and Gazprom Marketing & Trading, Ltd.
414 S.W.3d 142
| Tex. | 2013Background
- Moncrief Oil (Texas) alleges Gazprom and subsidiaries misappropriated trade secrets and tortiously interfered with Moncrief’s relationship with Occidental after meetings and communications about a proposed LNG/regasification joint venture in Texas.
- Key facts: Moncrief provided updated alleged trade-secret materials at two in-person meetings in Texas (Houston and Fort Worth) in late 2005; earlier meetings occurred in Moscow, Washington D.C., and Boston.
- Moncrief also alleges Gazprom met with Occidental in California and that a Gazprom subsidiary formed GMT USA in Houston as a competing enterprise.
- Gazprom and Gazprom Export filed special appearances asserting lack of personal jurisdiction; trial court granted them; the court of appeals affirmed.
- Texas Supreme Court: holds Texas has specific jurisdiction over Gazprom defendants for the trade-secrets claim (meetings in Texas where defendants received alleged secrets), but not for the tortious-interference claims (those arise from California contacts and/or a competing entity not imputable to defendants).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Texas courts have specific personal jurisdiction over Gazprom for trade-secret misappropriation | Moncrief: Gazprom purposefully availed itself by attending two Texas meetings and accepting alleged trade secrets about a Texas joint venture | Gazprom: contacts were random/fortuitous or unilateral disclosures by Moncrief; subjective intent was only to discuss settlement | Held: Jurisdiction exists — Gazprom’s Texas meetings where it accepted alleged trade secrets were purposeful contacts sufficient for specific jurisdiction |
| Whether Texas has specific jurisdiction over tortious-interference claims | Moncrief: Interference flowed from Gazprom’s Texas misappropriation and formation of a competing enterprise in Texas | Gazprom: Interference principally occurred in California (meetings with Occidental); competing enterprise in Texas cannot be imputed to Gazprom | Held: No jurisdiction — operative facts of interference focus on California meetings and a competing entity not attributable to Gazprom defendants |
| Whether subjective intent of Gazprom at Texas meetings negates jurisdiction | Moncrief: intent irrelevant to contacts; focus is on physical business contacts | Gazprom: they intended only to discuss settlement, not the joint venture | Held: Subjective intent does not defeat jurisdiction; courts assess contacts, not parties’ mental state |
| Abuse of discretion in denying additional depositions before special appearance hearing | Moncrief: depositions would produce jurisdictional facts needed for interference claims | Gazprom: additional depositions would be cumulative; record already addressed contacts | Held: No abuse — Moncrief did not show what new jurisdictional facts would be obtained; further depositions unnecessary for trade-secrets claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007) (specific-jurisdiction test requires substantial connection between forum contacts and operative facts)
- Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005) (unilateral activity of plaintiff insufficient to create jurisdiction; focus on defendant’s contacts)
- Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. 2009) (plaintiff’s pleading burden and defendant’s burden to negate pleaded jurisdictional bases)
- Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (purposeful availment and foreseeability of being haled into court)
- McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (single act can create substantial connection for jurisdiction)
- World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (contacts must not be random or fortuitous)
- BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002) (when trial court issues no findings, appellate court implies necessary fact findings supported by evidence)
- Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2010) (factors for fair play and substantial justice inquiry)