Monarch Beverage Company, Inc. v. David Cook, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission
2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 760
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Indiana law divides alcohol commerce into three tiers (manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers) and generally bars cross‑ownership between tiers; separate permits are required for beer, wine, and liquor distribution.
- Statutes at issue (the "Prohibited Interest Provisions") prohibit a wholesaler from holding both beer and liquor wholesale permits, while allowing combinations involving wine; wine/liquor permittees may distribute limited beer products and beer/wine permittees limited liquor products.
- Beer wholesalers receive statutory franchise protections (e.g., wrongful termination and compensation on supplier transfers) that wine/liquor wholesalers do not.
- Monarch Beverage is a long‑standing Indiana wholesaler holding beer and wine permits; it seeks to distribute liquor products made by its wine supplier but is barred from obtaining a liquor permit because it already holds a beer permit.
- Monarch sued, claiming the Prohibited Interest Provisions violate Article 1, Section 23 (Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause) of the Indiana Constitution by discriminating against beer wholesalers; the trial court granted summary judgment for the State and Monarch appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Prohibited Interest Provisions violate Indiana's Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause | Monarch: the statutes facially discriminate against beer wholesalers by denying them liquor permits and thus create unequal treatment not justified by inherent differences | State: the statutes treat all prospective wholesalers equally at the point of choice and any differences are rationally related to legitimate regulatory objectives | Court: Monarch failed to identify two disparately treated groups; statute treats all persons equally at election and post‑election; no Section 23 violation; summary judgment for State affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994) (articulates analytical framework for Indiana Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause)
- League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 2010) (applies Collins two‑part test and emphasizes deference to legislature)
- Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013) (party challenging statute on its face bears burden to show statute cannot be constitutionally applied)
- Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 1999) (presumption of constitutionality in statutory challenges)
- Robertson v. Gene B. Glick Co., 960 N.E.2d 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (threshold requirement to identify disparately treated classes for Section 23 analysis)
- Paul Stieler Enters., Inc. v. City of Evansville, 2 N.E.3d 1269 (Ind. 2014) (methodology for interpreting Indiana Constitution and presumption of constitutionality)