155 F.4th 499
6th Cir.2025Background
- Wilson County Board of Education permits public comment at monthly meetings under Policy 1.404 and a chair-read script; Policy 1.404 creates three avenues to speak and (previously) required speakers to state name and address.
- The chair’s script (previously) restricted “abusive” comments and stated topics must be specific to policies and procedures; the abusive-comment restriction appeared only in the script, not in Policy 1.404.
- Plaintiffs (Moms for Liberty — Wilson County Chapter, Amanda Dunagan-Price, Robin Lemons) challenged three rules under the First Amendment: (1) the public-interest limitation on recognizing non-agenda speakers, (2) an address-disclosure requirement, and (3) an abusive-comments restriction.
- Lemons was interrupted and asked to stop speaking after she refused to give her address and discussed an ongoing investigation; Dunagan-Price and others allege they self-censor out of fear the rules will be enforced.
- The district court denied a preliminary injunction; it found plaintiffs lacked a likelihood of success as to the public-interest provision (no credible threat of enforcement) and lacked imminent, irreparable harm as to the address and abusive-comment rules because the Board had rescinded those rules and represented it would not reinstate them.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: plaintiffs lacked standing for injunctive relief against the public-interest provision; they had standing as to the other two rules but failed to show likely, imminent, irreparable harm because the Board had voluntarily and durably ceased enforcement and counsel represented it would not reinstate the rules during litigation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge the public-interest provision that governs recognition of non-agenda speakers | Plaintiffs intend to continue speaking and thus are subject to the provision; it chills speech | Provision applies only to the narrow third avenue and plaintiffs have not used or intend to use that avenue; no credible threat | No standing; plaintiffs failed to show a credible threat of enforcement; injunction denied as to this provision |
| Whether plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctions against the address-disclosure and abusive-comments rules | Those rules deter and chill speech; address rule was enforced against Lemons; abusive rule is vague and chill-inducing | Board rescinded both rules and will not enforce/reinstate them during litigation | Plaintiffs have standing for these two rules (past enforcement + warnings create credible threat) |
| Whether plaintiffs established likelihood of imminent and irreparable harm warranting preliminary injunction for address and abusive-comment rules | Loss of First Amendment rights is irreparable and enforcement history shows probable future harm | Board voluntarily rescinded the rules, has not reinstated them for >2 years, and counsel bound the Board not to reinstate during the case | No likelihood of imminent irreparable harm; preliminary injunction denied because voluntary cessation and counsel’s representation mitigate the threat |
| Whether voluntary cessation by defendants moots or otherwise forecloses relief | Plaintiffs: cessation may be reversible and not dispositive (citing Roman Catholic Diocese and Speech First) | Defendants: cessation plus counsel representation and two-year dormancy make reinstatement unlikely; counsel’s representation binds client | Voluntary cessation did not moot the claims but was dispositive for preliminary-injunction relief because plaintiffs failed to show an imminent threat requiring immediate relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Ison v. Madison Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 3 F.4th 887 (6th Cir. 2021) (school-board public-comment forum is a limited public forum; limits must be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral)
- Lowery v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2009) (school-board public-comment periods are limited public fora; reasonable subject/process restrictions permitted)
- Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (forum analysis and standard for restrictions in nonpublic fora)
- Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (public, designated, and limited public forum framework)
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standard requires likelihood of success and irreparable harm)
- Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable injury)
- Forsyth Cnty. v. Nat’list Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (standing to challenge a municipal permitting regime where plaintiffs were subject to the regime)
- Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (2020) (voluntary modification of a policy does not necessarily prevent preliminary relief when threat of reapplication is ongoing)
- Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2019) (voluntary cessation and mootness analysis in preliminary-injunction context)
- Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43 (2024) (pre-enforcement standing requires clear showing at preliminary-injunction stage)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021) (standing is not dispensed in gross; each plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim)