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Molloy v. Independence Blue Cross
56 V.I. 155
Supreme Court of The Virgin Is...
2012
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Background

  • D.M., a premature newborn, required urgent air evacuation to Miami due to VI medical limitations.
  • Molloys sued BCBSVI and MASAI (and related Blue Cross entities) for torts, contract, and false advertising arising from delays in air-ambulance services.
  • D.M. was transported to Miami three days after birth; care delay allegedly caused by insurer approvals and service gaps.
  • BCBSA, alleged licensor, was dismissed early for lack of personal jurisdiction; case then languished for about two years before dismissal for failure to prosecute.
  • D.M.’s claims were settled; Molloys appealed arguing errors on jurisdiction, discovery, and Halliday-based dismissal.
  • This Court reversed in part: reinstated jurisdictional ruling for Count VI against BCBSA, and remanded for full Halliday-factor analysis on failure-to-prosecute dismissal.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Did the Superior Court err in dismissing BCBSA for lack of personal jurisdiction as to Count VI? Molloys contend BCBSA had sufficient Virgin Islands contacts via 4903(a)(1)/(2)/(4). BCBSA challenged jurisdiction; lower court determined no qualifying contacts tied to Counts II–V. Count VI jurisdiction established; reverse for Count VI only.
Was the discovery denial to compel BCBSPR interrogatories an abuse of discretion? Interrogatories relevant to BCBSA–BCBSPR relationship and VI contacts. interrogatories unrelated to BCBSA's VI contacts and thus not discovery-relevant. No abuse; six interrogatories deemed non-relevant to jurisdiction.
Did the Superior Court abuse its discretion in dismissing the Molloys’ claims for failure to prosecute without addressing all Halliday factors? Court should apply full six-factor Poulis/Halliday framework; misapplied by omitting meritoriousness and alternative sanctions. Court found sufficient grounds to dismiss under applicable factors. Yes; remanded to conduct full Halliday six-factor analysis with explicit findings.
If jurisdiction exists on Count VI, does due process allow specific jurisdiction over BCBSA? Minimum contacts plus arising-from/related to advertisements justify specific jurisdiction. Questionable link between BCBSA’s forum contacts and Counts II–V; only Count VI sustains. Specific jurisdiction valid for Count VI; affirmed remand for Halliday analysis.
Should the court apply a claim-by-claim or broader approach to 4903(b) arising-from analysis? Treat Counts II–V separately from Count VI; each arises from different contacts. Unified relation among related acts could justify a shared arising-from analysis. Adopted approach requires separate analysis per claim; Count VI sustained on 4903(a)(2)/(4).

Key Cases Cited

  • Halliday v. Footlocker Specialty, Inc., 53 V.I. 505 (V.I. 2010) (six-factor test for dismissal for failure to prosecute; explicit findings required)
  • Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) (six-factor framework for sanctions in dismissal)
  • In re Najawicz, 52 V.I. 311 (V.I. 2009) (two-part test for Virgin Islands personal jurisdiction (long-arm and due process))
  • O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007) (arising-from/related-to standard for specific jurisdiction in VI context)
  • Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2009) (evidence standard for prima facie jurisdiction showing)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Molloy v. Independence Blue Cross
Court Name: Supreme Court of The Virgin Islands
Date Published: Jan 9, 2012
Citation: 56 V.I. 155
Docket Number: S. Ct. Civil No. 2009-0102