Moises Pineda v. Chase Bank USA, N.A.
186 A.3d 1054
R.I.2018Background
- In 2008 Pineda refinanced two Providence properties; attorney Pasquale Scavitti III served as settlement/closing agent and received wires of loan proceeds from Chase.
- Scavitti diverted (defalcated) the loan proceeds and did not pay off the prior mortgages as instructed; Scavitti later was disbarred.
- Pineda sued Chase and Scavitti asserting breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and a civil-liability-for-crime claim; Chase moved for summary judgment.
- The hearing justice found a genuine factual dispute whether Scavitti was Chase’s agent, but concluded that, even if he were, Scavitti’s theft was outside the scope of any agency because it was not motivated in part to serve Chase.
- The Superior Court entered final judgment for Chase under Rule 54(b); Pineda appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Chase.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was a factual dispute that Scavitti was an agent of Chase | Scavitti had authority from Chase to receive/disburse loan funds; factual record supports agency | Scavitti was not Chase’s attorney/agent for the closing | Court: Genuine issue of material fact existed as to agency status; question appropriate for factfinder |
| Whether Scavitti’s misappropriation was within the scope of any agency such that Chase is vicariously liable | Pineda argued Chase benefited (recorded mortgages, promissory notes, subsequent payments) so Scavitti’s acts fall within scope | Chase argued theft was for Scavitti’s sole benefit and thus outside scope of employment/agency | Court: Held theft was not actuated in part to serve Chase; no evidence Scavitti intended to benefit Chase; acts outside scope—summary judgment proper |
| Whether summary judgment was proper given the record and burdens on parties | Pineda contended disputes of material fact existed that precluded summary judgment | Chase showed no genuine dispute on the scope-of-employment element; burden then shifted to Pineda to produce evidence | Court: Affirmed summary judgment—Pineda failed to produce competent evidence on an essential element |
| Whether granting summary judgment violated Pineda’s right to a jury trial | Pineda asserted violation but offered no developed argument or authority | Chase relied on legal sufficiency of its motion and lack of disputed material fact | Court: No violation—legal entitlement to judgment exists when no triable issue remains |
Key Cases Cited
- Fogarty v. Palumbo, 163 A.3d 526 (R.I. 2017) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Tarro v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598 (R.I. 2013) (appellate review employs same standards as hearing justice)
- Great American E & S Insurance Co. v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc., 45 A.3d 571 (R.I. 2012) (summary-judgment evidentiary rules)
- Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225 (R.I. 2007) (summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (nonmovant must produce evidence of essential elements)
- Credit Union Cent. Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262 (R.I. 2009) (agency issues at closings and factual nature of agency)
- McNulty v. Chip, 116 A.3d 173 (R.I. 2015) (existence of agency is a question of fact)
- Vargas Mfg. Co. v. Friedman, 661 A.2d 48 (R.I. 1995) (employer liable for acts within scope of employment)
- Burke v. St. Pierre, 642 A.2d 671 (R.I. 1994) (employee acts contrary to authorization are outside scope)
- Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386 (R.I. 2008) (burden shift after movant establishes no genuine dispute)