Mohammed Fawwaz Shoukfeh, M.D., P.A., D/B/A Texas Cardiac Center v. James G. Grattan and Texas Workforce Commission, 07-15-00113-CV

Dr. James Grattan worked for Texas Cardiac Center (TCC) from June 19, 2006 to April 30, 2013 and was paid by a formula in a letter allocating him net receipts minus direct expenses and a pro rata share of TCC overhead.
Historically TCC divided overhead evenly among its physicians (by number of practicing physicians).
In November 2012 TCC hired Dr. Ahmad Qaddour on a salaried agreement that did not require him to pay a share of overhead; nevertheless TCC’s overhead pool included Qaddour’s salary and TCC continued dividing overhead among three physicians (Shoukfeh, Overlie, Grattan).
Grattan claimed TCC underpaid him from Sept. 2012–Apr. 2013 because TCC deducted one-third of overhead rather than one-fourth and filed a wage claim with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC).
TWC ultimately awarded Grattan unpaid wages; TCC sought trial de novo in district court and lost on cross-motions for summary judgment. TCC appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Grattan’s contract required overhead to be divided among all practicing physicians such that overhead should have been divided by four when Qaddour was employed	Grattan: contract required a pro rata share of overhead based on number of physicians in the association; thus TCC should have divided overhead by four	TCC: Qaddour was not a "practicing physician" for overhead allocation (different duties/compensation), so TCC could allocate overhead among three physicians	Court held for Grattan/TWC: substantial evidence supports that "pro rata" meant division by number of physicians and nothing showed amendment or written authorization to deduct more than his pro rata share
Whether TWC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and properly afforded deference	Grattan: TWC’s factual finding was reasonable and supported by evidence of historical pro rata treatment	TCC: TWC erred as a matter of law by not enforcing the plain language excluding Qaddour from the pool; decision lacked substantial evidence	Court held TWC’s decision is supported by substantial evidence; appellate court may not substitute its judgment for TWC on factual disputes

Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1986) (standard for setting aside TWC decisions)
Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1998) (substantial evidence review of agency findings)
Blanchard v. Brazos Forest Products, L.P., 353 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011) (defining substantial-evidence standard in reviewing TWC decisions)
Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 2011) (contract interpretation—give effect to written expression of parties’ intent)
J. M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003) (harmonize contract provisions; avoid surplusage)
Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 2009) (summary judgment standard and evidence view on appeal)
Tex. Workforce Comm’n v. BL II Logistics, L.L.C., 237 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007) (administrative factfinding role and substantial-evidence rule)