Mohamed Al-Saffy v. Thomas Vilsack
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12120
D.C. Cir.2016Background
- Mohamed Tawid Al‑Saffy, an Egyptian‑American USDA Foreign Agricultural Service employee, alleged religious and national‑origin discrimination and retaliation after removal/redisignment from the Yemen Trade Office and related adverse actions.
- He filed two formal EEO complaints with USDA: the 2011 Complaint and the 2012 Complaint, each requesting ALJ hearings; later he withdrew the hearing requests and notified the EEOC he'd file in federal court.
- ALJs issued short orders: the 2011 ALJ dismissed the hearing request and remanded the complaint to the agency to issue a final decision under 29 C.F.R. §1614.110(b); the 2012 ALJ issued an order stating the “case is DISMISSED” citing the withdrawal letter but gave no notice of appeal or suit rights.
- Al‑Saffy sued in D.C. District Court on October 10, 2013 against USDA and the State Department; the district court granted summary judgment for the government as time‑barred and held State was not a proper defendant and its EEO claim untimely.
- The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding (1) the 2011 ALJ order was not final agency action and thus did not start the 90‑day Title VII clock, (2) the 2012 ALJ order failed to give required notice so could not trigger the 90‑day clock, and (3) genuine disputes of material fact existed about whether State was a joint employer and whether Al‑Saffy timely exhausted State EEO procedures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ order dismissing hearing request on 2011 Complaint became final agency action triggering 90‑day limitations for suit | AL‑Saffy: ALJ merely dismissed the hearing request and remanded to agency; no final action occurred so 90‑day clock did not start | Gov: ALJ dismissal ripened into final agency action after 40 days of agency inaction, starting the 90‑day clock | Court: ALJ order was not a §1614.109 decision and did not become final action; 90‑day clock did not start; suit timely under §1614.407(b) |
| Whether ALJ order on 2012 Complaint triggered 90‑day limitations | Al‑Saffy: ALJ omitted statutorily required notice of right to sue and time limits, so 90‑day clock did not start | Gov: ALJ dismissal became final agency action after 40 days and started the 90‑day clock | Court: Because the ALJ order omitted required notice of appeal/right to sue, it could not start the 90‑day clock; suit timely after 180 days |
| Whether State Department is a proper defendant under Title VII (employment relationship) | Al‑Saffy: Evidence shows State exercised control (reporting to Ambassadors, letters from USDA Secretary, ambassador affidavits, chief‑of‑mission statute) — joint‑employer question for jury | Gov: Al‑Saffy was a USDA employee, not a State employee; State not proper defendant | Court: Reversed summary judgment—genuine dispute of material fact exists whether State was a joint employer; issue for further proceedings |
| Whether Al‑Saffy timely exhausted EEO remedies against State | Al‑Saffy: He did not know of State’s role until 2013 affidavits; contacted State EEO within 45 days of those disclosures | Gov: Knowledge of McKay’s conduct in 2009–10 or prior USDA proceedings put him on notice earlier; untimely | Court: Fact issue exists whether Al‑Saffy knew of State’s involvement before the 2013 affidavits; summary judgment inappropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing EEOC’s administrative procedures for federal employees)
- Williams v. Hidalgo, 663 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (agency notice must include right to sue and filing deadline to start limitations period)
- Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (economic realities/control test for federal employment status)
- Redd v. Summers, 232 F.3d 933 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (joint‑employer analysis and tests for control)
- Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (use common‑law control principles to define employee for federal statutes)
- Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (statutory definition of employee is circular; look to common law for status)
- Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (standard of review for summary judgment)