Moen v. Bradenton Council on Aging, LLC
2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 857
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 6th2017Background
- Norma Silverthorne was admitted to Riverfront Nursing and Rehabilitation Center on April 14–15, 2013; she was incompetent when admission paperwork was signed.
- Her daughter, Susan Moen, signed the facility admission form and a separate Voluntary Arbitration Agreement on April 15, 2013, identifying herself as "dtr/proxy" and signing as "legal representative/Resident/Representative."
- Moen had been designated health care proxy but had not been given a durable power of attorney executed by Silverthorne.
- The Estate sued the Nursing Home alleging statutory violations that led to Silverthorne’s death; the Nursing Home moved to dismiss and to compel arbitration.
- The trial court, relying on depositions and counsel argument, found Moen signed as proxy/legal representative and that Silverthorne was a third-party beneficiary, and granted dismissal and compelled arbitration.
- On appeal, the Nursing Home conceded reversal was required after the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Mendez.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the incompetent resident was bound to arbitrate because Moen signed the arbitration agreement as her health care proxy | Moen (Estate) argued a health care proxy lacks authority to waive jury trial or bind the resident to arbitration; therefore Silverthorne is not bound | Nursing Home argued Moen’s signature as proxy/representative and the admission agreement made Silverthorne a third-party beneficiary, binding her to arbitration | Court reversed: a health care proxy does not have authority to bind an incompetent resident to arbitration; arbitration cannot be compelled here |
| Whether the resident was bound as a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement | Estate argued third-party beneficiary status does not attach because Moen lacked authority to execute arbitration on Silverthorne’s behalf | Nursing Home argued the admission/arbitration agreements conferred third-party beneficiary rights to the resident, making arbitration binding | Court (and Nursing Home’s concession post-Mendez) rejected binding arbitration via third-party beneficiary theory; order compelling arbitration reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Nestler-Poletto Realty, Inc. v. Kassin, 730 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (arbitration cannot be forced on a party who did not agree to arbitrate)
- Stalley v. Transitional Hosps. Corp. of Tampa, 44 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (only actual parties are generally bound by arbitration; nonsignatories bound under ordinary contract/agency principles)
- Martha A. Gottfried, Inc. v. Paulette Koch Real Estate, Inc., 778 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (nonsignatory enforcement limited by contract and agency principles)
- Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (health care proxy cannot waive jury trial or bind patient to arbitration)
- Estate of Irons ex rel. Springer v. Arcadia Healthcare, L.C., 66 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (health care power of attorney did not authorize signing arbitration agreement)
- Carrington Place of St. Pete, LLC v. Estate of Milo ex rel. Brito, 19 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (durable power of attorney insufficiently broad to authorize arbitration agreement)
- Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Center, LLC, 203 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court decision rejecting similar attempt to bind an incompetent resident to arbitration; prompted concession and reversal)