322 Conn. 20
Conn.2016Background
- On Sept. 8–9, 2011 Modzelewski’s (plaintiff) used recovery equipment (including a 1075 rotator and low‑bed tractor trailer) to recover, tow and store a damaged trailer and boat after a highway accident called in by state police.
- Plaintiff billed $14,732.50 (paid by Boat U.S. insurer); the DMV hearing officer found overcharges and ordered $12,787 restitution based on Connecticut regulations for nonconsensual medium‑duty towing.
- The DMV concluded state regulations govern nonconsensual tow pricing under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(C) but the hearing officer disallowed some charges; trial court partially reversed, holding state may regulate the actual tow but that pretowing recovery and post‑tow storage services were preempted by federal law.
- The Commissioner appealed the trial court’s conclusion that pretowing recovery and posttowing storage fees are federally preempted; the Supreme Court granted review on preemption scope under § 14501(c).
- The core legal question: whether federal preemption bars state regulation of prices for (a) recovery services performed before an actual tow and (b) storage/warehouse services after a nonconsensual tow.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pretowing recovery services (e.g., 1075 rotator use) fall within § 14501(c)(2)(C) exemption to preemption | §14501(c)(2)(C) only permits states to regulate the price of the actual towing itself (not recovery) | Recovery services are integral to "transportation" and thus within the nonconsensual tow price‑regulation exception | Held for Defendant: recovery services are part of "transportation" and state may regulate their prices; trial court's reinstatement of the 1075 charge was improper |
| Whether the broad "related to" preemption language bars state regulation of recovery fees | Broad preemption should include pretow services | Congressional intent and statutory definition of "transportation" support treating recovery as included in nonconsensual tow pricing exception | Held: the presumption against preemption controls; recovery fees fall within the exemption, so state regulation is permissible |
| Whether posttowing storage fees are preempted | Storage is incidental to transportation and thus preempted | Storage may be regulated by the state as part of nonconsensual tow pricing | Court declined to decide on merits because Commissioner did not challenge the trial court’s restoration order (no aggrievement) — no opinion on storage preemption |
| Scope of review and standard of statutory construction | N/A | N/A | Court applied de novo review to statutory interpretation and relied on text, history, and presumption against preemption to construe §14501(c)(2)(C) |
Key Cases Cited
- Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (U.S.) (describes general preemption of state regulation of motor‑carrier price/route/service)
- Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. New York, 171 F.3d 765 (2d Cir.) (guidance on applying "related to" preemption and interpreting towing exemptions)
- Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769 (U.S.) (explains limits of preemption where state rules may freeze or distort services offered in the market)
- Californians for Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Transportation v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir.) (interpreting "related to" language in similar preemption statutes)
- Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (U.S.) (broad reading of "related to" language in federal deregulation context)
Summary of outcome: The Supreme Court reversed the trial court insofar as it held that federal law preempted state regulation of pretowing recovery fees, concluding recovery services are part of "transportation" under §14501(c)(2)(C) and thus subject to state price regulation; the court affirmed other aspects and remanded for recalculation of restitution.