2023 CO 26
Colo.2023Background
- Commercial property owners in Jefferson County sued the county assessor and BOE in Dec. 2020 seeking revaluation of their 2020 assessments, alleging COVID-19 and attendant public‑health orders were “unusual conditions” under § 39‑1‑104(11)(b)(I).
- Plaintiffs argued (1) COVID‑19 was a “detrimental act[] of nature” and (2) state and local public‑health orders were “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land,” both of which would require mid‑cycle reassessments under Colorado’s two‑year reassessment scheme.
- The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding the pandemic was an indirect, intangible event not analogous to the ARL examples of detrimental acts of nature, and the orders regulated business operations (improvements), not the land itself.
- Plaintiffs appealed; the Colorado Supreme Court accepted review to decide whether COVID‑19 or the public‑health orders qualified as unusual conditions requiring revaluation.
- The Court analyzed the statute, the Assessors’ Reference Library (ARL), and precedent distinguishing land from improvements and excluding economic changes from the unusual‑conditions exception.
- Holding: COVID‑19 is not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” the public‑health orders are not regulations restricting the use of land, economic impacts are not an unusual condition, and the dismissal was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether COVID‑19 is a “detrimental act[] of nature” under § 39‑1‑104(11)(b)(I) | Pandemic caused harm/loss and fits definitions of detrimental and natural cause | Virus/pandemic is not the kind of overwhelming, physical natural event tied to real property | No — COVID‑19 is not an act of nature “in or related to” real property; statute/ARL examples limit the term |
| Whether public‑health orders are “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” | Orders restricted or prevented use of plaintiffs’ properties and thus restricted land use | Orders regulated business operations/improvements, not the land itself; they were temporary | No — orders affected operation of improvements, not the land’s legal use or categorization |
| Whether economic impacts of COVID‑19 constitute an unusual condition | Economic downturn from pandemic justifies mid‑cycle revaluation | Economic/economic‑condition changes are not among the statute’s enumerated unusual conditions | No — economic fluctuations are not unusual conditions under the statute or precedent |
| Whether dismissal for failure to state a claim was improper (factual‑support contention) | District court relied on factual assumptions and speculation | Plaintiffs’ theory fails as matter of law; dismissal appropriate | Affirmed — court resolved legal insufficiency and did not need to remand for factual development |
Key Cases Cited
- LaDuke v. CF & I Steel Corp., 785 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1990) (distinguishing land use from use of improvements; limits change‑of‑use unusual‑conditions claim)
- Carrara Place, Ltd. v. Arapahoe Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 761 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1988) (economic condition changes do not trigger unusual‑conditions reassessment)
- Huddleston v. Grand Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 913 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1996) (ARL binding on assessors)
- Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529 (Colo. 2010) (standards for reviewing Rule 12(b)(5) dismissals)
- Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2016) (pleading standard: plausible grounds to infer a claim)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause, 327 P.3d 232 (Colo. 2014) (deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
- BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Colorado Dep’t of Revenue, 369 P.3d 281 (Colo. 2016) (court not bound by agency interpretation)
- Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2010) (statutory interpretation principles for property tax statutes)