Mixter v. Farmer
81 A.3d 631
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2013Background
- Mixter (plaintiff/appellant) sued Farmer (defendant/appellee) alleging defamation (libel/slander), intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), tortious interference with existing contracts, and tortious interference with prospective advantage based on letters Farmer sent to attorneys and a client about Mixter’s alleged unprofessional conduct.
- Farmer sent initial letters in August 2010 notifying attorneys he was investigating possible AGC (Attorney Grievance Commission) complaints about Mixter; he filed an AGC grievance in December 2011 after additional correspondence.
- Mixter amended his complaint multiple times, later adding Charles Bowie as a co-defendant (alleging conspiracy/assistance) and asserting the same six counts against both defendants.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants on October 12, 2012, concluding absolute judicial/quasi‑judicial privilege protected the communications and, alternatively, that Mixter’s non‑defamation tort claims failed on the merits.
- On appeal the Maryland court affirmed: letters were protected by absolute privilege because they were made in contemplation of AGC proceedings (and privilege extended to non‑defamation torts arising from the same conduct), and Mixter’s IIED and interference claims failed for lack of required elements and specificity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether absolute judicial/quasi‑judicial privilege bars defamation (libel/slander) claims | Mixter: letters were not genuinely related to AGC proceedings (16‑month delay; inflammatory content); privilege should not apply | Farmer: letters expressly sought information for AGC complaints and thus are absolutely privileged even if made before formal filing | Held: Absolute privilege applies — letters related to contemplated AGC proceedings; delay and motive do not defeat absolute privilege |
| Whether absolute privilege or absence of privilege affects IIED claim | Mixter: privilege shouldn't shield IIED; Farmer acted maliciously and caused severe distress | Farmer: privilege extends to communications in anticipation of AGC; in any event the letters do not meet IIED elements | Held: Absolute privilege covers IIED when arising from same conduct as privileged communications; alternatively, IIED fails on the merits (not extreme/outrageous; distress not severe) |
| Whether absolute privilege or, absent privilege, summary judgment was improper on tortious interference with existing contracts | Mixter: Farmer’s letter to client Hancock induced breach or loss of existing contracts | Farmer: no specific breached contract identified; letter aimed to confirm termination and thus did not induce breach | Held: Summary judgment for defendants — Mixter failed to identify any specific breached contract or loss caused by Farmer’s communications |
| Whether absolute privilege or, absent privilege, summary judgment was improper on tortious interference with prospective advantage | Mixter: Farmer’s letters disrupted future business opportunities with Hancock and others | Farmer: plaintiff failed to identify a specific likely future relationship that was lost | Held: Summary judgment for defendants — Mixter offered only speculation, not the required specificity about likely future relationships |
Key Cases Cited
- Norman v. Borison, 418 Md. 630 (recognizing broad absolute privilege for attorney statements related to judicial proceedings)
- Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397 (policy rationale for broad privilege to protect administration of justice)
- Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23 Md. App. 628 (absolute privilege applies to statements made prior to judicial proceedings)
- Arundel Corp. v. Green, 75 Md. App. 77 (extension of privilege to quasi‑judicial proceedings and pre‑filing statements)
- Di Blasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512 (meritless complaints to disciplinary bodies are privileged; motive immaterial)
- Walker v. D’Alesandro, 212 Md. 163 (privilege not limited to defamation; may protect related torts)
- Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578 (if immunity exists for defamation, it can extend to other torts arising from same conduct)
- Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (absolute privilege shields federal officers for defamation and kindred torts)
- Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (First Amendment privilege applies to libel and IIED; supports extending privilege beyond defamation)