Mittenthal v. Florida Panthers Hockey Club, Ltd., 0:20-cv-60734

Plaintiffs (Mittenthal, Jairam, Hillow) allege they received unsolicited promotional text messages from Florida Panthers via an autodialing system in violation of the TCPA; they did not consent.
Plaintiffs originally sued in federal court, then voluntarily dismissed that action after circuit authority raised doubts about TCPA standing and refiled in Florida state court.
Defendants removed the refiling to federal court under federal-question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331 / § 1446).
Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing they lack Article III standing to bring TCPA claims in federal court (citing Salcedo v. Hanna).
Defendants relied on allegations in the now-abandoned federal complaint to assert standing and sought to oppose remand, propose jurisdictional discovery, or have the case dismissed.
The district court considered whether prior (abandoned) pleadings are admissible, whether standing must be alleged in the notice of removal, whether plaintiffs have Article III standing for unwanted texts, and what remedy is appropriate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of prior federal pleadings	Prior federal complaint allegations are not binding; operative (refiled) complaint controls	Prior federal complaint admissions can be used to show standing	Court: abandoned/amended pleadings are superseded and not admissible as binding evidence of standing (citing Eleventh Circuit precedent)
Pleading standing in notice of removal	Removing party must ultimately prove standing, but need not plead it in the notice	Notice need only allege the source of jurisdiction; standing need not appear in the removal notice	Court: removal notice need not plead standing, but the removing party must prove subject-matter jurisdiction (including standing) when challenged
Article III standing for TCPA text-message claims	Plaintiffs: statutory violation of TCPA suffices; alleged legal injury and harm support standing	Defendants: factual allegations in prior complaint (and novel theories like battery depletion) show concrete injury	Court: Under Spokeo and Salcedo, mere receipt of unwanted texts without concrete tangible or particularized intangible harm (e.g., wasted time, costs) fails to establish injury-in-fact; plaintiffs lack standing
Remedy when standing is lacking after removal	Plaintiffs seek remand to state court	Defendants request denial of remand, jurisdictional discovery, or dismissal	Court: Remand required under 28 U.S.C. §1447(c); jurisdictional discovery denied; dismissal as moot (remand, not dismissal)

Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019) (receipt of unsolicited text alone, without concrete harm, is insufficient for Article III standing in TCPA case)
Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. Sarris, 781 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (junk fax recipient had standing due to machine unavailability and tangible costs)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized even for statutory violations)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007) (operative pleading controls jurisdiction; abandoned pleadings should not bind plaintiffs)
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014) (procedural standards for removal notices)
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007) (courts look to the amended/operative complaint to determine jurisdiction)
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (subject-matter jurisdiction is an inflexible threshold issue)
McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936) (party invoking jurisdiction bears burden of proving it)