588 U.S. 840
SCOTUS2019Background
- Officer found Gerald Mitchell intoxicated, arrested him after a preliminary portable breath test read 0.24%, and transported him toward the station; Mitchell became increasingly lethargic and unconscious en route to the hospital.
- At the hospital an officer read Wisconsin's implied-consent notice to the unresponsive Mitchell and hospital staff drew blood; the test (about 90 minutes after arrest) showed BAC ~0.222%.
- Mitchell moved to suppress the blood-test results as an unconstitutional, warrantless search; Wisconsin relied on its implied-consent statute rather than exigent circumstances below.
- Wisconsin courts upheld the convictions under the state statute; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether a statute authorizing blood draws from unconscious motorists provides a Fourth Amendment exception.
- The Supreme Court vacated the Wisconsin decision and remanded, holding that when a driver is unconscious and breath testing is not reasonably possible, exigent circumstances will "almost always" permit a warrantless blood draw, subject to a defendant’s ability to rebut that presumption.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mitchell) | Defendant's Argument (Wisconsin) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wisconsin's implied-consent statute alone authorizes a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious motorist | Statutory "deemed consent" makes the blood draw lawful without a warrant | Implied consent (driver’s use of roads) supplies consent to draw blood when statutory conditions are met | Court rejected statutory implied consent as the basis for Fourth Amendment compliance; did not treat statute as creating actual consent |
| Whether a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious driver violates the Fourth Amendment absent a warrant | Warrant required when practicable; State conceded exigency did not apply here | Unconsciousness and inability to provide a breath sample justify blood testing under exigent-circumstances | Plurality: when officer has probable cause and unconsciousness prevents a reasonable opportunity for an evidentiary breath test, exigent circumstances will almost always permit a warrantless blood draw; remand for defendant to try to rebut |
| Whether the natural dissipation of BAC alone creates a per se exigency justifying warrantless blood draws | Dissipation alone insufficient; warrant required if practicable | (State did not press a per se dissipation rule below) | Court did not adopt a per se dissipation rule (left McNeely intact) but treated unconscious-driver category as routinely exigent because medical needs and transport often make delay to obtain a warrant impracticable |
| Standard / burden on remand for showing unlawfulness of warrantless draw | Defendant should be able to show officers had time and would have sought warrant; that blood was drawn for non-investigatory reasons | State argued officers reasonably believed delay would interfere with medical/public-safety duties | Court remanded so Mitchell may attempt to show (i) blood would not have been drawn but for investigative purpose and (ii) officers could not reasonably have believed a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw where delay threatened loss of evidence under special facts)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol does not create a categorical exigency; exigency must be assessed case-by-case)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. (2016) (breath tests may be administered incident to arrest; blood tests are more intrusive and generally require a warrant unless exigent circumstances exist)
- South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (refusal to submit to chemical test can be used against a defendant)
- Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (summary license suspension under implied-consent regimes does not violate due process when arrest is supported by probable cause)
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (exigency exception allows warrantless entry to render emergency assistance)
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (reiterating that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable absent established exceptions)