387 P.3d 934
Okla. Crim. App.2016Background
- In May 2009 Mitchell and co-defendant Morrison recruited two teens (Ingram and Parker) to rob a pharmacy; the robbery resulted in Parker being fatally shot and Mitchell driving the getaway car (a stolen Honda) and later abandoning it near the scene.
- Mitchell was convicted (after retrial) of first-degree murder (felony murder), conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon (after prior felonies), and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; sentences were life without parole plus consecutive terms.
- Mitchell had an earlier trial; this Court remanded because he was denied his Faretta right previously; at retrial Mitchell waived counsel and proceeded pro se with standby counsel appointed.
- Key disputed trial issues on appeal included whether Mitchell validly waived counsel, limits on standby counsel participation, sufficiency/corroboration of accomplice testimony, jury instructions on felony murder/attempt, use of a concealed shock device, admission of prior-conviction evidence, and cumulative error.
- The Court reviewed each proposition (mostly for abuse of discretion or plain error where no objection was preserved) and affirmed the convictions and sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Mitchell's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of waiver of counsel / self-representation | Waiver was not voluntary/knowing; he actually wanted appointed counsel and had medical/medication issues impairing competency | Court followed Faretta warnings, appointed standby counsel, Mitchell repeatedly and unequivocally chose to go pro se; trial court found him competent | Waiver was valid; no error in allowing self-representation (Proposition I denied) |
| Role/participation of standby counsel | Standby counsel (Bridge) should have been allowed to participate more actively and even take over at points | Standby counsel must not usurp defendant’s control; court appropriately limited participation to advising when asked | Limits on standby counsel were within discretion; no abuse (Proposition II denied) |
| Sufficiency / corroboration of accomplice testimony (Ingram) | Ingram’s testimony was uncorroborated and unreliable | Multiple independent items (witnesses, surveillance video, physical items, eyewitnesses seeing Mitchell at car) corroborated Ingram | Accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated; evidence supports convictions (Proposition IV denied) |
| Jury instructions on felony murder / attempted robbery | Instructions failed to separately instruct on attempt elements and thus were deficient | Instructions (uniform felony murder and modified attempted-robbery instruction plus principals/aiding instructions) accurately stated law and elements | Instructions were adequate; no prejudice shown (Proposition V denied) |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (constitutional right to self-representation and requirement of knowing, intelligent waiver)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on standby counsel to preserve pro se control)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (competency standard for waiving counsel same as for standing trial)
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (restraints visible to jury implicate defendant’s right to fair trial)
- Simpson v. State, 230 P.3d 888 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) (corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony)
- Pink v. State, 104 P.3d 584 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (accomplice testimony corroboration principles)
- Ochoa v. State, 136 P.3d 661 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (restraint use and requirement to show necessity and findings on record)
- Easlick v. State, 90 P.3d 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (standards for sufficiency of evidence review)
- Dickens v. State, 106 P.3d 599 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (escape as part of robbery for instruction purposes)