Mitchell v. Roberts, 469 P.3d 901

Terry Mitchell sued Richard Warren Roberts in federal court, alleging Roberts sexually abused her in 1981 when she was 16 and a witness in a criminal prosecution Roberts prosecuted.
Mitchell’s claims were time-barred under the prior statute of limitations, but she argued they were revived by the 2016 Utah statute (Utah Code §78B-2-308(7)) that temporarily allows certain child-sex-abuse claims to be filed despite being time-barred as of July 1, 2016.
Roberts challenged the legislature’s authority to retroactively revive time-barred claims; the federal magistrate judge certified questions to the Utah Supreme Court about the legislature’s power and whether the statute’s express revival language avoids analyzing vested-rights limitations.
The Utah Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing on whether due process/constitutional limits bar the legislature from retroactively extinguishing a defendant’s vested statute-of-limitations defense.
The court held that the Utah Legislature cannot constitutionally revive time‑barred claims in a way that deprives a defendant of a vested statute-of-limitations defense; it grounded that holding in (a) long-standing Utah precedent and (b) the original‑understanding of the state Due Process Clause.

Issue	Mitchell (Plaintiff)	Roberts (Defendant)	Held
May the Utah Legislature retroactively revive time‑barred civil claims by statute?	The 2016 statute expressly revives time‑barred child‑sex‑abuse claims and is a valid exercise of legislative power to address delayed reporting.	The legislature lacks constitutional power to retroactively divest a defendant of a vested limitations defense.	The legislature is constitutionally prohibited from retroactively reviving claims in a manner that vitiates a defendant’s vested statute‑of‑limitations defense.
Does the explicit revival language in Utah Code §78B‑2‑308(7) eliminate the need to analyze whether the change infringes vested rights?	The statute’s explicit retroactivity means it governs and revives previously time‑barred claims (no further vested‑rights inquiry needed).	Express retroactive language cannot overcome constitutional limits protecting vested defenses; vested‑rights analysis remains necessary.	Explicit statutory language cannot authorize a retroactive divestiture of a vested defense; the vested‑rights/due‑process limit controls regardless of express revival language.

In re Handley’s Estate, 49 P. 829 (Utah 1897) (held legislature cannot retroactively divest vested rights or substitute for judicial judgments)
Ireland v. Mackintosh, 61 P. 901 (Utah 1900) (held a defendant acquires a vested statute‑of‑limitations defense once the limitations period has run; legislature cannot revive such claims)
In re Swan’s Estate, 79 P.2d 999 (Utah 1938) (refused to apply a later extension of limitations where the bar already had taken effect)
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975) (reaffirmed that subsequent extension of limitation cannot renew a cause of action already barred)
Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224 (Utah 1978) (same rule: once statute has run the cause is dead and cannot be revived by extension)
Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1995) (stated the defense of an expired statute of limitations is a vested right the legislature cannot take away)
State v. Apotex Corp., 282 P.3d 66 (Utah 2012) (addressed an express statutory retroactive revival and held the legislature cannot resurrect claims already expired under the previous law)
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (U.S. 1885) (U.S. Supreme Court decision discussed as an outlier that held a limitations bar is not necessarily a vested property right)